Catching Unfitness by Lee, Jon J.
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2021 
Catching Unfitness 
Jon J. Lee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jon J. Lee, Catching Unfitness, 34 355 (2021), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/
faculty_articles/739. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 




How can the legal profession effectively regulate the multitude of ways in
which an attorney may commit misconduct, given our evolving understanding of
what it means to be "fit" to practice law? As the ABA's adoption of an ethical
provision to proscribe harassment and discriminatory acts (Model Rule 8.4(g))
has shown, it is nearly impossible to craft a specific rule that is simultaneously
effective at capturing the relevant misconduct and immune from attack that it
goes too far.
If disciplinary authorities had a general catchall rule, they could regulate the
ever-changing ways in which misconduct is manifested. In fact, the ABA once
promulgated just such a rule, the fitness-to-practice provision, but it was elimi-
nated due to concerns about vagueness, overbreadth, and duplication.
This Article is the first to present an empirical study of how disciplinary
authorities regulate general lawyer misconduct, with a focus on the fitness-to-
practice provision. Through the use of a variety of analytical methods, the study
identifies how the seven states that have retained the fitness-to-practice provi-
sion use it to regulate misconduct. When properly administered, the fitness-to-
practice provision can effectively regulate otherwise elusive lawyer misconduct
that is not fully captured by other rules or that falls within the gaps between the
rules-including abusive conduct, discrimination, harassment, sexual miscon-
duct, and breaches of trust.
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INTRODUCTION
The regulation of lawyer impropriety is a persistent critical challenge facing
the profession. Prominent instances of lawyer misconduct frequently capture
national attention. Both Richard Nixon1 and Bill Clinton 2 were sanctioned by dis-
ciplinary authorities as a result of the misconduct that occurred during their presi-
dencies. Michel Cohen, President Trump's personal lawyer, was automatically
disbarred in New York after pleading guilty to making a false statement to the
U.S. Congress amid speculation that he had also paid money to several women
who had engaged in affairs with Trump.3 Samuel Kent unceremoniously resigned
from his post as a federal district court judge after pleading guilty to committing
sexual assault against two female court employees and being impeached by the
U.S. House of Representatives.4
In recent years, it is this latter type of misconduct that has received increased
public scrutiny, including the accusations of sexual assault made against then-
U.S. Supreme Court Justice nominee Brett Kavanaugh and the contentious investigation
that ensued.5 Irrespective of one's opinion of Kavanaugh's culpability, his confirmation
hearings called attention to a pervasive problem in the legal profession.6
But these headline-grabbing stories do not even begin to capture the depth or
breadth of the crisis. A quick search of published opinions regarding lawyer disci-
pline brings up not only cases in which lawyers committed the "expected" types
of misconduct-failing to communicate with clients, neglecting matters, or mis-
handling funds-but also cases in which lawyers committed acts that defy imagi-
nation. While meeting with a prospective client who was seeking a divorce, an
1. Tom Goldstein, New York Court Disbars Nixon for Watergate Acts, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 1976), https://
www.nytimes.com/1976/07/09/archives/new-york-court-disbars-nixon-for-watergate-acts-nixon-disbarred-by.
html [https://perma.cc/4FKD-9BK9].
2. Duncan Campbell, Lewinsky Scandal Ends as Clinton is Disbarred, GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2001), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/02/duncancampbell [https://perma.cc/DLB4-RLVF].
3. Kevin Johnson, Michael Cohen, President Trump's Former Lawyer, Disbarred Because of His Felony
Convictions, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/26/michael-
cohen-disbarred-felony-convictions-prompt-removal/2995414002/ [https://perma.cc/TUN4-YG6P]. See generally
Brian Sheppard, The Ethics Resistance, 32 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 235 (2019) (discussing and analyzing the legal
ethics complaints brought against members of the Trump Administration).
4. S.A. Miller, Impeached Judge Samuel B. Kent Tenders His Resignation, WASHINGTON TIMES (June 27,
2009), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/27/impeached-judge-tenders-his-resignation/ [https://
perma.cc/K4LT-SNLP].
5. See Christine Hauser, The Women Who Have Accused Brett Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/26/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-accusers-women.html [https://perma.cc/HNT8-
KREX] (describing the allegations and the women involved).
6. See generally Katherine Yon Ebright, Taking #MeToo Seriously in the Legal Profession, 32 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 57, 58 (2019) (examining the investigation of claims of gender violence and harassment in the
legal profession); INT'L BAR ASS'N, US TOO? BULLYING AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION




Alabama attorney took multiple pictures of the woman in various poses, claiming
that he needed them "for his files."7 After the consultation, the attorney asked the
woman if she would like to "make quick, easy money by posing nude" and
handed her a business card.8 In Ohio, an attorney engaged in relentless verbal
abuse and harassment of his paralegal for more than two years.9 On one occasion,
the attorney told the paralegal and another female employee that they "should
give him road head so that he could rate their performances on a scale from one
to ten."10 On another occasion, the same attorney told an African-American client
that the paralegal "did not like [B]lack people," leaving the paralegal to defend
herself against his accusation." In New York, an attorney became belligerent af-
ter being discharged by a client and sought revenge by notifying officers about
the former client's immigration status-even going so far as to provide officers
with information to assist in the former client's deportation.1 2
The primary method by which the legal profession regulates these and other mis-
deeds is the promulgation of ethical rules and the imposition of discipline against
attorneys who violate them. While there is variation among states in their codes of
professional conduct,13 all are modeled after and largely replicate the American Bar
Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules).14 The
early professional codes were written as broad aims to which lawyers should aspire,
but the codes progressively have become both denser and more specific, now serv-
ing as a method of sanctioning attorneys who fail to meet their demands."
With regard to the regulation of discrimination and harassment, it took the
ABA over two decades to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g), a provision that explicitly
proscribes such misconduct. Despite the fact that twenty states already had some
7. Disciplinary Notices, ALA. LAw., Jan. 2015, at 77, https://www.alabar.org/assets/2014/08/The_
Alabama_Lawyer _01-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY2H-YP3F].
8. Id.
9. Disciplinary Counsel v. Skolnick, 104 N.E.3d 775, 775 (Ohio 2018).
10. Id. at 776 (internal quotations omitted).
11. Id.
12. In re Gonzalez, 132 A.D.3d 1, 4-5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
13. Jurisdictional Rules Comparison Charts, AM. BAR Ass'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional responsibility/policy/rulecharts/ [https://perma.cc/G93N-QM3W] (last visited March 25, 2021).
14. See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS'N, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rules of professionalconduct/alpha
liststateadopting model rules/ [https://perma.cc/M6TP-9D9C] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018) (listing the
dates of state adoption of the Model Rules). California became the last state to adopt the Model Rules on
November 1, 2018. Lorelei Laird, California Approves Major Revision to Attorney Ethics Rules, Hewing
Closer to ABA Model Rules, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
california approves major evisiontoattorney ethics rules hewing closer _t [https://perma.cc/6FCE-YPVZ].
15. See, e.g., LaRue T. Hosmer & Daniel C. Powell, Schafer's Dilemma: Client Confidentiality vs. Judicial
Integrity-A Very Different Proposal for the Revision of Model Rule 1.6, 49 Loy. L. REv. 405, 435 (2003)
(describing ethics rules as proceeding along a vector from "discretionary guides" in the beginning, to "categori-
cal rules" in the present).
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version of an anti-bias16 provision in effect at the time of its 2016 adoption, Rule
8.4(g) was met with vociferous opposition by a number of states and several legal
scholars." While two states adopted Rule 8.4(g) in the ensuing three years, at
least six others considered but declined to adopt the provision, often citing consti-
tutional concerns.18 These challenges raise the question of whether there is
another way, in addition to the adoption of a specific ethics provision, for discipli-
nary authorities to regulate these types of misconduct.
In fact, there is another way. Included within the Model Rules are several general
provisions that proscribe misconduct that extends beyond traditional lawyering
tasks, including "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"
and "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."19 These so-called
"catchall provisions" first appeared in the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code), the precursor to the Model Rules.20 Some ethics
scholars, including Samuel J. Levine, have touted the value of having broad provi-
sions like the catchall provisions to regulate misconduct that does not neatly fit
within existing rules.2 1
The most general of these catchall provisions was the fitness-to-practice (FTP)
provision, which prohibited an attorney from "[e]ngag[ing] in any other conduct
that adversely reflects on [the attorney's] fitness to practice law." 22 Indeed, the
FTP provision was used to sanction each of the attorneys who committed the mis-
deeds in Alabama, Ohio, and New York described above. The ABA eliminated
the FTP provision-but not its catchall counterparts-during the transition from
16. This Article uses the phrase "anti-bias provision" to collectively refer to disciplinary provisions that pro-
scribe bias, prejudice, harassment, and/or discrimination. Although this phrase is an imprecise one, it is impos-
sible to adequately capture the variation in such provisions.
17. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 241, 243 (2017) (contending that states should proceed with caution before adopting Rule 8.4(g)
on account of First Amendment concerns); George W. Dent, Jr., Model Rule 8.4(g): Blatantly Unconstitutional
and Blatantly Political, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 135, 135 (2018) (arguing that Rule 8.4(g)
violates a lawyer's constitutional rights and could be leveraged as a political weapon).
18. Debra Cassens Weiss, Second State Adopts ABA Model Rule Barring Discrimination and Harassment
by Lawyers, A.B.A. J. (June 13, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/second-state-adopts-aba-
model-rule-barring-discrimination-by-lawyers [https://perma.cc/2CWY-VS4D] (noting that Maine and
Vermont had enacted a version of Rule 8.4(g) by June 2019, approximately three years after the ABA's
adoption); Kristine A. Kubes, Cara D. Davis & Mary E. Schwind, The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4 (g):
Working to Eliminate Bias, Discrimination, and Harassment i  the Practice of Law, AM. BAR ASS'N (Mar.
12, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction-industry/publications/under construction/
2019/spring/model-rule-8-4/ [https://perma.cc/3EB2-NHTL].
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c)-(d) (2018) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; see also Jerry
Cohen, Appropriate Dispositions in Cases of Lawyer Misconduct, 82 MASS. L. REv. 295, 300-01 (1997) (dis-
cussing the use of catchall provisions to regulate lawyer misconduct).
20. See infra Part L.A (describing the inclusion of the catchall provisions in the Model Code).
21. See generally Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: Broad Ethics Provisions and
Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic Framework, 77 TULANE L. REv. 527 (2003)
(arguing that broad ethics provisions, including the fitness-to-practice provision, should be included in ethics
codes in order to regulate misconduct that does not fit within specific rules).
22. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
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the Model Code to the Model Rules.' In advocating for its removal, detractors
mentioned the risk that the provision could duplicate other existing rules as well
as the risk that the provision could be wielded in an overly broad fashion.4 Yet
no evidence was put forward that either of these risks had or would come to frui-
tion. Even more importantly, there was no consideration of the effect that the
elimination of the FTP provision would have on the ability to regulate the ever-
changing ways in which an attorney may commit misconduct.
This Article is the first to comprehensively study the FTP provision, and it con-
cludes that he provision can be an effective tool to regulate elusive attorney mis-
conduct. Despite the fact that the FTP provision was eliminated during the
transition from the Model Code to the Model Rules, seven states-Alabama,
Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Washington-retained
the provision,5 and all of these states maintain their records in such a way as to
permit examination.26 Through the use of several different types of analytical
techniques, this empirical study identifies the ways in which these seven states
have administered the FTP provision. When used properly, the FTP provision
enables disciplinary authorities to sanction particularly egregious misconduct
that violates an existing rule as well as to regulate misconduct that falls outside
the current rules. Through the implementation of best practices, the benefits of
the FTP provision can be fully realized while concerns about its reach can be
mitigated. Therefore, the ABA and all states should adopt the FTP provision and
implement the best practices for its effective administration.
Part I summarizes the history of attorney disciplinary codes in the United
States, focusing on the ways that general types of misconduct have been regu-
lated. Part II examines the current controversy surrounding Model Rule 8.4(g),
which regulates discrimination and harassment, and puts it in the context of the
broader debate over catchall provisions such as the FTP provision. Part III pro-
vides a theoretical framework for understanding attorney discipline, including the
first scholarly contribution identifying a set of guiding principles to use when
evaluating the effectiveness of an ethical rule. Part IV presents the results of a
groundbreaking empirical study of all publicly-available disciplinary actions in
seven states over eight years-more than 2,700 actions in total-focusing on the
FTP provision. Part V evaluates these results in light of the purposes to be served
by adopting the FTP provision and concerns about i s use. It concludes that he
FTP provision has value, both in sanctioning particularly egregious conduct and
in regulating misconduct that falls in the gaps between existing rules.
23. See infra Part I.B.
24. See, e.g., ABA House of Delegates, Tr. of Proceedings Concerning Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, Tape 12, Feb. 8, 1983 (testimony of Mike Frank).
25. CPR Policy Implementation Comm., Variations of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule
8.4: Misconduct, AM. BAR Ass'N (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
professional _responsibility/mrpc_8_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VYQ-QXTT].
26. See infra Part IV.B (describing how the seven states maintain disciplinary records).
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I. REGULATING MISCONDUCT: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Despite the fact that adherence to a code of professional conduct is now
accepted as an integral part of one's obligations as a legal practitioner, lawyer
codes are of a relatively recent vintage. This Part describes the evolution of the
ABA model codes, from the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics to the current
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In particular, this Part examines how
these codes have addressed the regulation of general types of misconduct that
bear on an attorney's ability to carry out responsibilities ethically and effectively.
A. FROM THE CANONS TO THE MODEL CODE
There were a few instances of state bar associations adopting individual rules
related to professional conduct during the nineteenth century, but the first com-
prehensive state code was adopted in Alabama in 1887.27 The Alabama Code
became the model for ten other states before the promulgation of the 1908
Canons of Professional Ethics (Canons),28 and the Alabama Code likewise was
extremely influential in the drafting of the Canons.29
Considerable scholarly attention and criticism have been devoted to the
Canons, which have at times been cast as too specific and at other times as too
vague.30 According to Geoffrey Hazard, "[t]he Canons presupposed that right-
thinking lawyers knew the proper thing to do and that most lawyers were right-
thinking," which limited their practical effect.31 Perhaps for these reasons, the
Canons did not directly proscribe misconduct bearing on a lawyer's fitness to
practice law or other general misconduct. The closest references appeared in the
Preamble and in the final canon. The Preamble exhorted that the maintenance of
justice requires that "the conduct and the motives of the members of our profes-
sion are such as to merit the approval of all just men."3 2 Canon 32, entitled "The
Lawyer's Duty in Its Last Analysis," concluded with the following sentence:
"But above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fi-
delity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and
loyal citizen."33
27. Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV.
1385, 1434-35 (2004) (detailing the history of lawyer codes, both in the United States and around the world).
28. See Walter Burgwyn Jones, First Legal Code of Ethics Adopted in the United States, 8 A.B.A. J. 111
(1922) (describing how the Alabama code was "adopted almost totidem verbis in . . . Georgia, Virginia,
Michigan, Colorado, North Carolina, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri").
29. See generally James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv.
2395 (2003) (providing a comprehensive history of the adoption of the Canons).
30. Id. at 2442.
31. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1250 (1991); see also Fred C.
Zacharias, The Quest for a Perfect Code, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787, 790-91 (1998) (describing the Canons
as consisting almost entirely of "aspirational principles that guide and inspire" rather than providing concrete
rules).
32. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS pmbl. (1908) [hereinafter 1908 CANONS].
33. 1908 CANONS Canon 32.
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Despite the fact that the Canons did not have the force of law in any state, they
initially met with great success in regard to their adoption and acceptance. By
1910, twenty-two states had adopted the Canons outright, and a number of other
jurisdictions relied upon them in setting their ethical norms.34 But the criticism
quickly mounted. As early as 1924, the ABA had created four committees to
work on a redesign of the Canons.3 5 Sixteen canons were added and several exist-
ing canons were amended during the next forty years,36 but those modifications
could not shore up the structural defects of the Canons.
In 1969, the ABA eschewed the Canons and adopted the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility.3 7 The Model Code was organized into three parts:
(1) canons, which were "axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the stand-
ards of professional conduct expected of lawyers"; (2) ethical considerations,
which were aspirational statements of the "objectives toward which every mem-
ber of the profession should strive"; and (3) disciplinary rules, which identified
"the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action."3 While lawyers were obligated to conform their
conduct only to the disciplinary rules, the canons and ethical considerations could
be used to interpret the rules' meanings.39
The Model Code expanded upon the Canons in three major ways. First, it was
considerably more comprehensive in the types of misconduct addressed.40
Second, it was far more detailed, particularly with regard to its disciplinary
rules.41 Third, it clearly delineated the distinction between those parts that were
aspirational (canons and ethical considerations) and those that could be the sub-
ject of disciplinary enforcement (disciplinary rules).42
34. Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 911, 918 (1994).
35. John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules of Ethics, 42 HOFSTRA L. REv.
55, 61 (2013).
36. See John M. Tyson, A Short History of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics,
Code of Professional Responsibility, and Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, 1 CHARLOTTE L. REv 9,
13 (2008) ("From 1908 to 1969, new canons were adopted and added, and other canons were amended on three
occasions.").
37. See id.; see also Edward L Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and Objectives,
24 ARK. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1970) (describing the adoption of the Model Code and the weaknesses with the
Canons).
38. MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement.
39. See MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement.
40. See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a
Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REv. 411, 436
(2005) ("[T]he [Model] Code is the ABA's first explicit division between 'professionalism' and minimum
[r]ules.").
41. See Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil Litigation Advocacy: A Historical Perspective, 63
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 381, 426 (2012) (detailing the development of legal ethics rules and describing the
Model Code as "longer and more complex" in its prescriptions than the Canons).
42. MODEL CODE Preliminary Statement; see Andrews, supra note 41, at 426-27 (describing the three
parts).
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Furthermore, the Model Code explicitly proscribed general types of attorney
misconduct. They were included in the first canon, entitled "A Lawyer Should
Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession."43
The relevant ethical consideration, EC 1-5, provided that a lawyer "should main-
tain high standards of professional conduct," be temperate and dignified," and
"refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct."44
The Model Code included a single disciplinary rule associated with EC 1-5,
"Misconduct" (DR 1-102). The rule contained six subsections, including
(3) "engag[ing] in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude" (the "crime provi-
sion"), (4) "engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation" (the "fraud provision"), (5) "engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice" (the "administration-of-justice provision"), and
(6) "engag[ing] in any other conduct that adversely reflects on [the attorney's] fit-
ness to practice law"45 (the "fitness-to-practice provision" or "FTP provision").
The phrase "catchall provisions" appears to have originated with the Textual and
Historical Notes for DR 1-102, which acknowledged that the drafting committee
had been "apparent[ly] indecisive[]" in the precise wording for these provisions.46
The commentary to DR 1-102 similarly illustrates the tension in the enforce-
ment of catchall provisions. On one hand, it is clear that the catchall provisions
were intended to apply quite broadly, including to lawyers' actions outside their
professional capacities.47 On the other hand, the commentary noted that each of
the catchall provisions had been criticized on the grounds of being overbroad and
ambiguous, with the potential to proscribe conduct that has "no obvious connec-
tion with professional skills and responsibility."4
Interestingly, the commentary paid considerably less attention to the FTP pro-
vision than the other catchall provisions, each of which had been the subject of
extensive debate and dissension.49 The commentary merely noted that a single
court had suggested that the FTP provision might be constitutionally suspect but
found that it was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the specific conduct
in the case before it.50
The reaction at the time was similarly mixed among ethics scholars. While not-
ing the improvements over the Canons as a general matter, Donald Weckstein
suggested that the inclusion of general misconduct provisions, especially at the
43. MODEL CODE Canon 1.
44. MODEL CODE EC 1-5.
45. MODEL CODE DR 1-102.
46. AM. BAR FOUND., ANNOTATED CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY 12 (1979).
47. See id. at 18-19; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 336 (1974)
(addressing the extent to which the misconduct rule applies to activities outside of a lawyer's professional
duties).
48. AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 46, at 21.
49. See id. at 14-18.
50. See id. at 18 (citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 345 A.2d 616 (Pa. 1975)).
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beginning of the Model Code, might be "overkill."" With regard to the FTP pro-
vision itself, he was "uncertain" what would be included within its prohibition,
musing that it could include "social drinking, growing a beard, or owning a night
club jointly with a football player."5 2 However, he declined to recommend its re-
moval "unless it proves to be unnecessary or unless a more acceptable substitute
can be found.""
B. THE MODEL RULES AND DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FITNESS-TO-
PRACTICE PROVISION
The Model Code received an even more widespread reception than did the
Canons among state disciplinary authorities, as it was quickly adopted in some
form in every state.54 But the "legalization" of the disciplinary rules in the Model
Code brought controversy along with it, as their enforcement highlighted their
shortcomings." In 1977, the ABA appointed a commission to study the continued
vitality of the Model Code. Ultimately, the commission concluded that the Model
Code should be not amended but rather replaced with a new code of professional
conduct.56
The result, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, departed consider-
ably from the Model Code that had preceded it. The Model Rules eliminated the
norm-based canons as an organizing and unifying principle and instead organized
professional responsibilities around rules that are binding obligations.57 Although
the rules included comments that could inform the interpretation of a provision or
otherwise provide guidance on how lawyers may ethically conduct themselves,
the Scope of the Model Rules made it clear that "the text of each [r]ule is
authoritative. "58
The Model Rules have been adopted in large part by all state disciplinary
authorities.59 Although the ABA has made significant amendments to the Model
Rules, including in the areas of law firm practice, advertising, technology, and
globalization, there has not been a concerted effort to replace the Model Rules as
was done with the prior professional codes.60
51. See Donald T. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEx.
L. REV. 267, 280 (1970).
52. Id. at 276.
53. Id.
54. See Hazard, supra note 31, at 1251.
55. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 1448.
56. See Michael Ariens, The Last Hurrah: The Kutak Commission and the End of Optimism, 49 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 689, 700 (2016) (describing the Kutak Commission as responding to "'widespread apprehension over
the effectiveness of the current Code and its utility"').
57. See Hazard, supra note 31, at 1251.
58. MODEL RULES scope para. 21.
59. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
60. See ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, AM. BAR Ass'N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/committeescommissions/aba-commission-on-ethics-20-20/ [https://perma.cc/7P28-UMDT] (last
visited Apr. 4, 2021).
2021] 365
366 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 34:355
Nevertheless, the paradigm shift from the Model Code to the Model Rules had
an adverse impact on the general misconduct rule. The 1980 Discussion Draft of
the Model Rules (Discussion Draft), which was widely circulated for notice and
comment, placed the misconduct provision at the very end rather than at the be-
ginning, where it had been located in the Model Code, and it eliminated the fraud
and administration-of-justice provisions.61 The crime provision and FTP provi-
sion were somewhat combined into a single provision, prohibiting an attorney
from "commit[ing] a crime or other deliberately wrongful act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness in other respects to
practice law."6 2
The Discussion Draft received comments from fifty-eight legal organizations
and fifty-one individuals.63 Of these comments, only three touched on the com-
bined provision or on the removal of the standalone FTP provision. One comment
recommended that the FTP provision be retained rather than combined with the
crime provision;64 one noted that its members were indecisive on whether the
combined provision should be adopted or whether even more general language,
such as "conduct unbecoming a lawyer," should be adopted instead;6 and one
recommended removing the language "fitness in other respects to practice law"
from the combined provision because the commenter believed the language was
"vague and indefinite."66
The proposed revisions to the general misconduct rule remained largely intact
until the February 1983 Midyear meeting,67 at which the Iowa State Bar
Association proposed amendments that restored the fraud and administration-of-
justice provisions68 and further restricted the combined provision so that it only
proscribed acts deemed criminal under substantive law; in effect, returning the
combined provision to a version of the crime provision.69 The commission did
not oppose these amendments, and they were adopted without any discussion
from the ABA House of Delegates.70
61. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, R. 10.4 (AM. BAR ASS'N, Discussion Draft 1980) [herein-
after DRAFT RULES].
62. DRAFT RULES R. 10.4(b).
63. See generally COMPILATION OF COMMENTS ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. ed., 1980) [hereinafter DISCUSSION DRAFT] (compiling all comments on Discussion
Draft).
64. Id. at 0-34 (comment of ABA Section of Corp., Banking, and Bus. L.).
65. Id. at 0-49 (comment of Minn. St. Bar Ass'n).
66. Id. at 0-54 (comment of Omaha Bar Ass'n).
67. At the August 1982 Annual Meeting, the combined provision had changed to "commit[ting] a criminal
or fraudulent act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects." A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 1982-2013 850 (Art Garwin ed., 2013) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 851 (adding "(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation" and
"(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice").
69. Id. (striking "or fraudulent [act]" from the combined provision).
70. See ABA House of Delegates, supra note 24, at Tape 12.
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The Florida Bar recommended amendments substantially similar to
Iowa's and also proposed the retention of the FTP provision.7 1 In response,
one delegate remarked that the provision "is so vague and some courts have
so held, because it provides absolutely no guidance to the lawyer who wants
to stay out of disciplinary difficulty as to what may get him into it." 72 In
response to this criticism, the Florida Bar representative noted that they had
"strange things happening from time to time," such as lawyers who had
attempted to extract sexual favors in lieu of monetary payment and other
similar activities that were "hard to fit in a little category."73 But without
any further discussion on the matter, besides noting that other provisions
such as the administration-of-justice provision might sufficiently regulate
the misconduct, the proposal to retain the FTP provision was rejected by a
voice vote of the ABA House of Delegates.74
Other than the inclusion of provisions related to governmental agencies
and judges, the final version of the general misconduct rule (Rule 8.4) in the
Model Rules was substantially similar to its Model Code predecessor-that
is, with the exception of the elimination of the FTP provision.75 It is striking
that there was relatively little explanation given for its exclusion, in con-
trast to the extensive attention and debate afforded to other instances in
which the Model Rules deviated from the Model Code.7 6
Although there is variation among states in relation to the adoption of Rule 8.4,
several generalities can be made. First, all states have adopted versions of the
crime (Rule 8.4(b)) and fraud (Rule 8.4(c)) provisions.77 Second, forty-three states
71. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 852 (proposing to add "engage in any other conduct that
adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law").
72. ABA House of Delegates, supra note 24, at Tape 12 (testimony of Mike Frank).
73. Id. (testimony of Rep. Dittmar).
74. Id. (statement of Chair); see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 852 (noting the defeat of the
Florida Bar Amendment by voice vote).
75. Compare MODEL CODE DR 1-102, with MODEL RULES R. 8.4. The only other difference between the
two is in relation to the crime provision, since the Model Code prohibited "illegal conduct involving moral tur-
pitude" and the Model Rules prohibit "criminal act[s] that reflect[] adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustwor-
thiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Compare MODEL CODE DR 1-102(3), with MODEL RULES R.
8.4(b). Although the Model Rules version does include "fitness as a lawyer" in it, it is narrower than the com-
bined provision in the Discussion Draft because it requires that the conduct be "criminal" rather than merely
"wrongful." See DRAFT RULES R. 10.4(b).
76. See generally DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 63 (containing dozens of comments on changes to the con-
flict of interest provisions).
77. See CPR Policy Implementation Comm., supra note 25.
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 34:355
have adopted a version of the administration-of-justice provision (Rule 8.4(d)).78
Third, seven states have r tained a version of the FTP provision despite its elimi-
nation in the Model Rules: Alabama, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, New
York, Ohio, and Washington. These seven states provide a unique opportunity to
examine the FTP provision, to determine whether it can be a mechanism to effec-
tively regulate elusive attorney misconduct-including that of attorneys who
engage in discrimination or harassment.
II. THE STRUGGLE TO REGULATE DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT:
MODEL RULE 8.4(G) AND ITS AFTERMATH
In sharp contrast with the lack of discussion concerning the ABA's elimination
of the FTP provision, substantial attention was paid to the ABA's adoption of an
anti-bias provision-a process that began after the promulgation of the Model
Rules and lasted for decades. In the interim, both the legal landscape and societal
norms shifted considerably, underlining the need for the profession to regulate
discrimination and harassment. But despite he apparent consensus among those
in the ABA House of Delegates at the time of its adoption, Model Rule 8.4(g) has
not been well received by states that have considered whether to amend their own
codes to include it.
This Part explains the genesis of Rule 8.4(g) and presents the concerns related
to state adoption. It highlights the struggle that a regulatory body faces in drafting
a provision that fairly and constitutionally proscribes behavior that does not com-
port with our evolving understanding of ethical conduct, and it shows that having
more specific language does not necessarily make it immune from criticism.
A. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT
It is not surprising that here was no concerted effort to include an anti-bias
provision in the Model Rules at the time of their initial adoption in 1983. Though
the prevalence of discrimination and harassment in the legal profession has been
well documented, those within the profession have been slow (and, at times,
reluctant) to acknowledge their existence.79 In fact, the only mention of such mis-
conduct was in relation to the elimination of the FTP provision.80 At that time, it
was unquestionably assumed that in the event such "unusual" misconduct were to
78. See id. The seven states that have not adopted the administration-of-justice provision are Alaska,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Hampshire, Virginia, nd Wisconsin. Id. Although the ABA's compiled in-
formation is unclear on whether Ohio has adopted the administration-of-justice provision, it appears as Rule
8.4(d) in the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (OHIO ST. BAR
ASS'N 2021) [hereinafter OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT].
79. See generally Veronica Root Martinez, Combating Silence in the Profession, 105 VA. L. REV. 805 (2019)
(recounting the legal profession's history of overt discrimination and describing the genesis of Rule 8.4(g)).
80. See Katie Marie Wroten, "G" Is More Than "PC" for Georgia: Why Prospective Adoption of ABA
Model Rule 8.4(g) Is a Viable Measure to Combat Discrimination and Harassment, 52 GA. L. REV. 341, 347
(2017).
368
2021] CATCHING UNFITNESS 369
occur, other provisions, such as the administration-of-justice provision, would be
broad enough to cover it.81
In 1992, the ABA Task Force on Minorities in the Justice System issued its
report, entitled "Achieving Justice in a Diverse America," specifically urging the
adoption of an anti-bias provision in the Model Rules.82 This report influenced the
drafting of two proposals.83 The first, recommended by the ABA Young
Lawyer's Division (YLD), would have prohibited "discrimination or harassment
committed in connection with a lawyer's professional activities."84 The second,
recommended by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility (SCEPR), would have made it professional misconduct to "know-
ingly manifest by words or conduct, in the course of representing a client, bias or
prejudice."85 While the two proposals shared several features, they differed in
key ways, including: the categories of misconduct that would be prohibited,
whether there would be a requisite mental state, and whether the conduct had to
occur while representing a client.86
Given the differences between these two proposals, one might have expected
there to have been a robust discussion of them. There was not, however, because
both proposals were withdrawn before any consideration of them by the ABA
House of Delegates.87 Although the two groups agreed at the time to work to-
gether to reconcile their differences and bring a joint proposal forward the follow-
ing year, they were unable to do so-apparently because they concluded that they
could not draft an anti-bias provision that would survive First Amendment
scrutiny.88
In 1998, momentum built once again to incorporate an anti-bias provision into
the Model Rules.89 Although the ABA Criminal Justice Section and SCEPR both
81. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
82. AM. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, ACHIEVING JUSTICE IN A
DIVERSE AMERICA 28 (1992) (asserting that "[n]o lawyer should intentionally engage in racially or ethnically
discriminatory acts in the practice of his or her profession" and that "[t]he Task Force recommends that the
ABA consider amending its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to make acts of racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion while acting in one's professional capacity sanctionable and unprofessional conduct").
83. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 854-86; see also Latonia Haney Keith, Cultural Competency
in a Post-Model Rule 8.4(g) World, 25 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 4-5 (2017) (discussing the dual
proposals).
84. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 854.
85. Id. at 855.
86. Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide for State Courts
Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 203-04 (2017); see also Andrew F. Halaby &
Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g): Legislative History, Enforceability
Questions, and a Call for Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL PROF. 201, 206-07 (2017) (detailing the language of the
SCEPR and YLD proposals).
87. Gillers, supra note 86, at 203.
88. See id. at 204.
89. See Michael William Fires, Regulating Conduct: A Model Rule Against Discrimination and the
Importance of Legitimate Advocacy, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735, 736 (2017) (discussing the adoption of
Comment [3]).
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had recommended proposals to adopt new rules, a compromise resulted in the adoption
of a new comment (Comment [3]) to Rule 8.4(d), the administration-of-justice provi-
sion. Comment [3] provided that "[a] lawyer who, in the course of representing a cli-
ent, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex,
religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, vio-
lates [8.4](d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice." 91
While in some respects the adoption of Comment [3] marked a significant step
toward the proscription of discrimination and harassment,92 its impact was less-
ened by the fact that comments do not carry any authoritative weight.93
Furthermore, the comment was limited to conduct made "in the course of repre-
senting a client" that was simultaneously "prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice."94 Taken together, these limitations meant that even if states were to adopt
this comment, it would not add anything new to their ability to regulate attorney
misconduct. Presumably, states could have already regulated such misconduct
under Rule 8.4(d) because the misconduct was-by definition-prejudicial to the
administration of justice. In fact, the comment was even narrower than Rule
8.4(d) itself, since the comment required that the conduct be done "knowingly";
Rule 8.4(d) does not have a requisite mental state.95
B. THE ADOPTION OF RULE 8.4(g): A TRIUMPH?
Another ten years passed between the adoption of Comment [3] and the ABA's
next attempt to address discrimination and harassment in the profession. In 2008,
the ABA adopted a number of goals as part of its Mission Statement.96 Goal III,
"Eliminate Bias and Enhance Diversity," acknowledged that there was still much
work to do on these fronts.97 Although this goal included a number of facets beyond
changes to the rules, there was a recognition that Comment [3] did not adequately
regulate the ways in which lawyers may engage in discrimination or harassment.98
90. Although this comment was originally adopted as Comment [2], it became known as Comment [3] due
to a renumbering of the provisions. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 860, 862-63.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 MODEL RULES]. For purposes
of this Article, this comment will be referred to as Comment [3] to Rule 8.4(d) because it related to the administra-
tion-of-justice provision. In fact, the comments are not linked to subsections but rules (in this case, Rule 8.4).
92. Martinez, supra note 79, at 821-22 (quoting ABA literature that describes Comment [3] as "a necessary
and significant first step to address the issues of bias").
93. See MODEL RULES scope para. 14.
94. See 2013 MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 3; Wroten, supra note 80, at 350 (identifying the restricted scope of
Comment [3]).
95. See Gillers, supra note 86, at 207 (discussing the limited impact of Comment [3]).
96. Id. at 201-02.
97. See Haila Garrido Hull, Diversity in the Legal Profession: Moving from Rhetoric to Reality, 4 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 1, 5 (2013) (describing Goal III as building on a series of resolutions and goals indicating continued
attention to an ongoing problem of discrimination in the profession).
98. Martinez, supra note 79, at 824 (quoting ABA literature admitting Comment [3] "does not adequately
address discriminatory or harassing behavior by lawyers").
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The stage was et for the adoption of Rule 8.4(g). In 2014, several ABA com-
missions that had been formed in connection with Goal III recommended the
adoption of a new rule to address discrimination and harassment. Accordingly,
several draft rules and comments were produced over the following two years.99
While a complete discussion of these drafts is beyond the scope of this Article,
there are three relevant issues that inform an understanding of the mixed recep-
tion of Rule 8.4(g) among legal scholars and state authorities. First, there were
differences among drafts with regard to whether the misconduct must occur
"while engaged in the practice of law" or be "related to the practice of law."100
The latter, broader language was eventually adopted, and it includes activities
such as "operating or managing a law firm" and "participating in bar association,
business or social activities in connection with the practice of law."101
Second, the proposed rule initially included a comment clarifying that it "does
not apply to conduct unrelated to the practice of law or conduct protected by the
First Amendment."1 2 The Memorandum accompanying the proposal suggested
that the clarification was included "[t]o avoid ambiguity" and to "make [it] clear
that a lawyer does retain a 'private sphere' where personal opinion, freedom of
association, religious expression, and political speech is protected by the First
Amendment and not subject to the Rule."10 3 Eventually, this clarification was
removed and replaced with language describing the types of discrimination and
harassment that would subject a lawyer to discipline. 104
Third, there were differences among drafts regarding the requisite mental state.
While the initial draft required that the lawyer's conduct be done "knowingly,"
similar to its Comment [3] predecessor, later drafts and the final rule expanded
the conduct to that which a lawyer "knows or reasonably should know" is dis-
crimination or harassment.10' Although this change represented an expansion of
99. Gillers, supra note 86, at 211-13.
100. Id. at 211-12.
101. See MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 4.
102. Halaby, supra note 86, at 215-16 (identifying and discussing the inclusion of the First Amendment
clarification).
103. ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Memorandum on Draft Proposal to Amend
Model Rule 8.4 5 (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_
responsibility/rule_8_4_language-choicememo_12_22_2015.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/M682-
2VFD].
104. See MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 3 ("Such discrimination includes harmful verbal or physical conduct
that manifests bias or prejudice towards others. Harassment includes sexual harassment and derogatory or
demeaning verbal or physical conduct. Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."); see also Bill Olson &
Herb Titus, The ABA Plan to Politically Purify the Legal Profession, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/the-aba-plan-to-politically-purify-the-legal-profession
[https://perma.cc/58R2-TULY ] (discussing the removal of the First Amendment clarification from the
proposed comment to Rule 8.4).
105. See Gillers, supra note 86, at 211-12 (discussing the state of mind requirement).
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liability in relation to its predecessor, there were some involved in the process
who advocated for there to be no requisite mental state at all. 106
By and large, all of the changes in Rule 8.4(g) from the initial draft to the final
rule and comments served to expand its reach.107 Indeed, it has been lauded by
scholars such as Steven Gillers for going further than any of its state counterparts
in regulating discrimination and harassment in the profession.108 Perhaps most
astonishingly, the meeting at which it was adopted was more reminiscent of a cel-
ebration than a heated discussion. After the resolution was put forward for discus-
sion, dozens of members spoke in favor of the resolution, many telling their
personal stories of experiencing discrimination or harassment.109 No one spoke in
opposition, and the resolution for its adoption passed by voice vote with almost
no audible dissent.110
C. THE OPPOSITION AGAINST STATE ADOPTION OF
RULE 8.4(g)
Despite the fact that Rule 8.4(g) appeared to garner overwhelming support by
the ABA House of Delegates, its passage has not brought about the sea change
that proponents had hoped for or expected. Only a few states have adopted Rule
8.4(g), whereas several other states expressly have declined to adopt it.111
Likewise, there has been considerable discussion and dissension in the scholarly
community about the legal and normative implications of state adoption.1 2 This
section identifies the primary arguments, as they serve to frame the issues that
arise in fashioning a provision that fairly and equitably regulates misconduct that
is difficult to define.
1. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS
The first set of concerns, raised by Josh Blackman among others, is that Rule
8.4(g) and associated comments are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague."3
There are two aspects to these concerns; the first relates to the scope of the phrase
"conduct related to the practice of law" used in Rule 8.4(g). Because Comment [4]
106. Wroten, supra note 80, at 357 (noting that the YLD had proposed a version without a requisite mental
state).
107. See generally Halaby, supra note 86 (describing the passage of Rule 8.4(g) in detail and raising ques-
tions about its utility and fairness in light of the broad language adopted).
108. See Gillers, supra note 86, at 230.
109. See Samson Habte, ABA Delegates Overwhelmingly Approve Anti-Bias Rule, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10,
2016), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/aba-delegates-overwhelmingly-approve-anti-
bias-rule [https://perma.cc/89KD-F5TV].
110. Martinez, supra note 79, at 824 (recounting that the provision "passed unanimously without any
expression of dissent").
111. See Kubes, supra note 18 (discussing state adoption of Rule 8.4(g)).
112. See, e.g., Convention, Using the Licensing Power of the Administrative State: Model Rule 8.4(g), 31
REGENT U.L. REv 31 (2019) (roundtable discussion among professional responsibility scholars about Rule 8.4(g)).




to Rule 8.4 defines the phrase to include "participating in bar association, business
or social activities in connection with the practice of law," among other activities,
critics have suggested that it might include statements made uring a dinner with a
client, at continuing legal education (CLE) events, in op-eds or blog posts, in a law
school classroom, or in academic scholarship.1 4 Presumably, these forums would
be ones in which the state would not have the ability to sanction conduct that might
otherwise fall within the prohibitions of Rule 8.4(g).1 5
The second aspect to these concerns, which is connected with the first, relates to
the phrase "harassment or discrimination" used to identify the two types of prohib-
ited conduct.116 A comment to Rule 8.4 refers to the types of conduct "include[d]"
in these terms; for discrimination, it is "harmful verbal or physical conduct that
manifests bias or prejudice toward others," and for harassment, it is "sexual harass-
ment and derogatory or demeaning verbal or physical conduct."1 7 Critics take
issue with the definition of harassment in particular, positing that "derogatory or
demeaning" verbal conduct could include a speaker at a CLE event stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not restrict the use of classifications on the basis of
sexual orientation.1 8
The responses to these two sets of concerns are largely based on how similar
challenges to disciplinary rules and laws that restrict lawyer speech have been
rejected in the past.119 There are dozens of lawyer disciplinary rules that regulate
lawyer speech; Rule 1.6 (confidentiality), Rule 3.6 (trial publicity), and Rule 3.4(e)
(statements during trial) all regulate lawyer speech in the context of client repre-
sentation, and no facial constitutional challenges have ever been successful.1 20
That is because a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth will succeed
only when "(i) it is 'substantially overbroad'-that is, its illegitimate applica-
tions are too numerous 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep,' and (ii) no constitutionally adequate narrowing construction suggests
itself." 121 According to those who believe that Rule 8.4(g) is not unconstitution-
ally overbroad or vague, the critics' identification of isolated instances in which
114. Dent, supra note 17, at 142-43.
115. See Michael S. McGinniss, Expressing Conscience with Candor: Saint Thomas More and First
Freedoms in the Legal Profession, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 173, 215 (2017) (recounting a Montana resolu-
tion characterizing Rule 8.4(g) as "exceeding judicial authority 'to regulate the speech and conduct of
attorneys'").
116. Dent, supra note 17, at 135, 141-42 (identifying the phrase and raising concerns about i s meaning).
117. MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 3. Comment [3] has been revised in conjunction with the adoption of Rule
8.4(g); the previous version addressed the circumstances in which bias and prejudice would violate the adminis-
tration-of-justice provision. See 2013 MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 3.
118. Blackman, supra note 17, at 245-46.
119. See generally Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between
Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (2018) (identifying and analyzing the primary
First Amendment speech arguments).
120. See id. at 36-37.
121. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991); see also Aviel,
supra note 119, at 43 (discussing Fallon's contribution).
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Rule 8.4(g) arguably could be used to regulate constitutionally-protected con-
duct pale in comparison to the instances in which it could be used to regulate
unprotected speech and conduct.'
Between these two extremes, several scholars have noted that the attempt to
expand the reach of Rule 8.4(g) through its comments created colorable constitu-
tional claims that have provided fuel for critics to latch onto to dissuade state
authorities from adopting Rule 8.4(g).123 Some scholars have suggested narrow-
ing the scope of the comments1 4 or eliminating portions of them altogether.'
2. CONTENT AND VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
The second set of concerns, raised most prominently by Eugene Volokh,1 26 is
that the language of Rule 8.4(g) violates the First Amendment by permitting state
disciplinary authorities to engage in content and viewpoint discrimination. The
tenor of this argument is that although the rule purports to regulate discrimination
and harassment, disciplinary authorities will use it to sanction attorneys expressing
viewpoints with which they disagree.127 In fact, critics suggest that Comment [4]
to Rule 8.4 is not viewpoint neutral on its face, since it exempts "conduct under-
taken to promote diversity and inclusion . . . [such as] implementing initiatives
aimed at recruiting, hiring, retaining and advancing diverse employees or sponsor-
ing diverse law student organizations." This exemption, according to some, sug-
gests that the rule will be applied against those who hold conservative viewpoints
on divisive issues such as affirmative action and the constitutional rights of people
who are members of a minority related to sex or gender.128
A related argument against state adoption of Rule 8.4(g) is that the rule will
have a chilling effect on lawyer speech. In some ways, this argument dovetails
with the arguments discussed previously. But in other respects, the argument is
grounded in the signal that Rule 8.4(g) sends to those who hold anti-establishment
122. See Aviel, supra note 119, at 44-45.
123. See Martinez, supra note 79, at 831-32.
124. See Aviel, supra note 119, at 57-58 (suggesting it could be limited to conduct against persons).
125. See Blackman, supra note 17, at 263 (suggesting several changes, including the elimination of lan-
guage in Comment [4] to Rule 8.4). But see Wendy N. Hess, Addressing Sexual Harassment in the Legal
Profession: The Opportunity to Use Model Rule 8.4(g) to Protect Women From Harassment, 96 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 579, 597-98 (2019) (suggesting that, if anything, the comments to Rule 8.4(g) unnecessarily
limit its scope).
126. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Montana Legislature Expresses Opposition to ABA-Proposed
Lawyer Speech Code, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/04/12/montana-legislature-expresses-opposition-to-aba-proposed-lawyer-speech-code/
[https://perma.cc/DTB3-XF7L].
127. Id.; see also McGinniss, supra note 115, at 206 (identifying the concern). At least one federal court has
strongly suggested that this argument has merit, granting a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of
Pennsylvania's version of Rule 8.4(g). Greenberg v. Haggerty, Civil Action No. 20-3822 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7,
2020).
128. Blackman, supra note 17, at 259-60.
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viewpoints.129 Critics point to the ABA's decision to eliminate the proposed clari-
fication that the rule "does not apply to conduct unrelated to the practice of law or
conduct protected by the First Amendment."13 While on the one hand it could be
argued that such a clarification is unnecessary-of course, no discipline could be
imposed that would violate an attorney's First Amendment rights-its removal
could be construed as a signal that such rights are subjugated to the eradication of
conduct that is proscribed by Rule 8.4(g).131
The responses to these criticisms have been more pragmatic in nature.
Proponents of Rule 8.4(g) point to the paradigmatic cases in which states have
sanctioned an attorney based on discriminatory or harassing conduct, implicitly
suggesting that the rule will be applied only in such cases.13 2 One of the most fre-
quently cited examples, In re Schiff, is especially pertinent to this Article. In that
case, a New York lawyer received a public censure after he referred to opposing
counsel, a woman, as "b*tch," called her a "c**t," and an "*ss," and told her to
"go home and have babies."133 Notably, the lawyer was disciplined for violating
New York's FTP provision. In affirming the disciplinary committee's imposition
of discipline, the Appellate Division noted that the lawyer "was unduly intimidat-
ing and abusive toward the defendant's counsel, and he directed vulgar, obscene
and sexist epithets toward her anatomy and gender," which "reflects adversely on
his fitness to practice law." 134
Another common response r ferences disciplinary self-restraint. At the time of
its adoption, proponents of Rule 8.4(g) highlighted the fact that the adoption of
other anti-bias provisions in states had not led to an influx of disciplinary actions
based on those provisions.1 3' Likewise, the late Deborah Rhode suggested that
disciplinary authorities do not have the inclination, time, or resources to sanction
attorneys based on ideological differences, calling this criticism "wildly out of
touch with reality." 136
129. See Olson, supra note 104 (framing Rule 8.4(g) as a plan to "'purify' politically the legal profession").
130. Blackman, supra note 17, at 248-49 (quoting the original proposed language and criticizing its
removal).
131. McGinniss, supra note 115, at 213.
132. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 86, at 216-17 (discussing instances in which lawyers have been sanc-
tioned based on more "imprecise" language than that found in Rule 8.4(g)).
133. In re Schiff, No. HP 22/92 (Departmental Disc. Comm. N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1993).
134. See In re Schiff, 190 A.D.2d 293, 294 (N.Y. 1993) (affirming the disciplinary board's recommendation
of a public censure for FTP-provision violation).
135. AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: REVISED RESOLUTION 6 (2016) (discussing
the low number of complaints in states that had adopted an anti-bias provision); see also Keith, supra note 83,
at 32-35 (compiling data on the use of state anti-bias provisions).
136. See The Federalist Society, Ninth Annual Rosenkratz Debate: Hostile Environment Law and the First
Amendment, YOUTUBE (Nov. 20, 2016), https://youtu.be/MYsNkMw32Eg [https://perma.cc/WB7T-SXEF]
(comments of Prof. Deborah Rhode).
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3. EXPANSION OF REQUISITE MENTAL STATE
A third concern relates to the expansion of the requisite mental state beyond con-
duct that a lawyer "knows" is harassment or discrimination to conduct that a lawyer
"reasonably should know" is harassment or discrimination.13 7 George Dent, in par-
ticular, argues that a negligence-like standard has never used in an anti-bias provi-
sion in a disciplinary context.138 Indeed, the precursor to Rule 8.4(g), Comment [3]
to Rule 8.4(d), prohibited an attorney from "knowingly manifest[ing]" bias or prej-
udice.139 Scholars on both sides of the debate have posited that he inclusion of the
"reasonably should know" language could capture conduct that is the result of
unconscious bias, such as microaggressions.140
Interestingly, less attention has been devoted to explaining or justifying the
inclusion of the "reasonably should know" modifier in Rule 8.4(g). On one hand,
the ABA has frequently adopted general misconduct provisions that contain no
express mental state. For example, Rule 8.4(d) proscribes "engag[ing] in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration to justice."141 And, more pertinent to this
Article, the FTP provision had prohibited "[e]ngaging in any other conduct that
adversely reflects on [the attorney's] fitness to practice law." 142 On the other hand,
even the staunchest of proponents of Rule 8.4(g) has suggested that a plausible reading
of the rule could allow the sanctioning of an attorney who engaged in unintentional
discrimination-a result that seems contrary to the spirit of the rule.143
D. LESSONS LEARNED
A number of insights that can be gleaned from the struggle to adopt Rule 8.4(g)
and the ensuing controversy can inform the way that the legal profession
approaches the regulation of misconduct that does not fit within an existing rule.
Indeed, these insights have prompted this Article's reexamination of the FTP pro-
vision as a promising addition.
First, the process for amending the rules is a long and difficult one-and even
more so when it comes to regulating areas that extend beyond the traditional
client-lawyer relationship. Rule 8.4(g) represents the first major change to the
137. Dent, supra note 17, at 143-44.
138. Id.
139. 2013 MODEL RULES R. 8.4 cmt. 3; see also Convention, supra note 112, at 59-60 (exchange between
Prof. Rotunda and audience member about shift in culpability requirement).
140. Compare Debra Chopp, Addressing Cultural Bias in the Legal Profession, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 367, 402-03 (2017) (stating that she "would have supported the elimination of the word 'knowingly'
from" Rule 8.4(g), and asserting that lawyers should be required by professional conduct standards "to refrain
from manifestations of bias, whether those manifestations come from their conscious or unconscious bias"),
with Dent, supra note 17, at 144 (expressing the concern that the "reasonably should know" language could
lead to the sanctioning of microaggressions).
141. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(d).
142. MODEL CODE DR 1-102(6).




general misconduct rule since the adoption of the Model Rules in 1983. From the
time that the first proposal was put forward, it took more than two decades for the
ABA to adopt such a provision in its black-letter rules. In the meantime, the ABA
made a number of significant changes to its rules to account for advances in tech-
nology, changes in how law firms operate, and the impact of globalization. 14 4
Second, the ABA's attempt to more specifically identify the types of settings in
which Rule 8.4(g) would apply invariably led to concerns about its constitutionality.
Specifically, the use of the phrase "conduct related to the practice of law" along
with a nonexclusive list of activities led some to argue that it could be applied in set-
tings that should be off-limits for professional regulation.14 5 Importantly, several
critics of Rule 8.4(g) suggested that the inclusion of language tying the conduct to
an attorney's "fitness to practice" would be more justifiable and preferable.146
Third, any attempt to regulate general misconduct will give rise to assertions
of unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness. Concerns that phrases such as
"harassment or discrimination" and "related to" could potentially sweep in other-
wise constitutionally-protected conduct are reminiscent of Donald Weckstein's
criticism of the Model Code's inclusion of the FTP provision, which he posited
could include "social drinking, growing a beard, or owning a night club jointly
with a football player."14 7 Yet again the FTP provision figures prominently in this
debate-albeit from the standpoint of proponents of Rule 8.4(g). They point out
that challenges on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness have routinely been
rebuffed in connection with "more general" and "more elusive" provisions such
as the FTP provision. 14 8 The seminal case in this regard is In re Holtzman, in
which the New York Court of Appeals stated-in connection with its use of
the FTP provision to sanction an attorney in a case of first impression-that
"[b]road standards governing professional conduct are permissible and indeed of-
ten necessary. "149 That is because "it is difficult, if not impossible, to enumerate
and define, with legal precision, every offense for which an attorney ought o be
removed."150
144. See ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 60 (describing the work of the ABA Commission on
Ethics 20/20, which led to a number of changes in the Model Rules).
145. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ' Responsibility, Joint Comment Regarding Proposed Changes to
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 6 (Dec. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional _responsibility/abamodel rule%208_4_comments/
joint _comment_52_memberattys_1_19_16.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LS4-7T24] ("[F]or the first
time, the new rule ... subject[s] attorneys to discipline for engaging in conduct that neither adversely affects
the attorney's fitness to practice law nor seriously interferes with the proper and efficient operation of the
judicial system.").
146. See Blackman, supra note 17, at 257.
147. Weckstein, supra note 51, at 276.
148. Gillers, supra note 86, at 216 ("more general"); Wroten, supra note 80, at 372 ("more elusive"); see
also Aviel, supra note 119, at 64-65 (discussing the use of the FTP provision to sanction such misconduct).
149. In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1991).
150. Id. (quoting Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 14 (1856)); see also Gillers, supra note 86, at 216 n.80 (dis-
cussing cases in which New York found an FTP-provision violation).
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Fourth, despite the fact that Rule 8.4(g) went even further than the state anti-
bias provision counterparts that were in existence at the time, it still fails to fully
address the myriad ways in which attorney misconduct of this type may arise
now and in the future. The litany of cases and actions cited in support of the adop-
tion of Rule 8.4(g) shows that it is nearly impossible to circumscribe the proscribed
conduct and its settings, circumstances, and context."1 Some have argued that a
reference in the comments to substantive anti-harassment and anti-discrimination
laws will unnecessarily narrow the rule's application to only those actions that vio-
late one of those statutes.' Relatedly, it has been argued that explicitly modeling
Rule 8.4(g) after anti-discrimination laws will limit its application to egregious
instances of overt discrimination rather than the more pervasive yet subtle ways in
which discrimination, harassment, and other types of abuse of authority undermine
the profession.153 Indeed, the statistics cited by the ABA in support of its contention
that Rule 8.4(g) would not open the floodgates to disciplinary actions are the same
ones used to suggest hat the adoption of any single anti-bias provision will not pro-
duce any real change in the profession."1 4
Perhaps in response to the continuing controversy around state adoption of
Rule 8.4(g), the ABA issued a formal ethics opinion on July 15, 2020, providing
guidance on its import and application.15 The opinion provided additional expla-
nation on the terms "harassment" and "discrimination," rejected the argument
that Rule 8.4(g) is unconstitutional by referencing similar rules that have with-
stood constitutional scrutiny, clarified that the rule applies only to harmful con-
duct, and provided five hypotheticals to illustrate its application.156 Although the
opinion suggests that conduct violating Rule 8.4(g) "will often be intentional," it
reiterates that he standard is one of "objective reasonableness.""1 7 Given the
recency of the issuance of the opinion, it is unclear whether it will assuage the
concerns of those critical of Rule 8.4(g).
The foregoing discussion about the limits of Rule 8.4(g) should not be con-
strued as a recommendation against state adoption. However, it does highlight
the need for additional mechanisms, beyond the adoption of any single anti-bias
151. See Habte, supra note 109 (recounting the experiences of some attorneys who spoke up in favor of
adopting Rule 8.4(g)).
152. See, e.g., Hess, supra note 125, at 604 (advocating for states to reject incorporating state anti-harass-
ment and anti-discrimination jurisprudence into their interpretations of Rule 8.4(g)).
153. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 79, at 829-30 (cautioning that Rule 8.4(g) is likely to have a limited
effect).
154. See Ebright, supra note 6, at 67-73 (discussing the lack of disciplinary actions and the possible explan-
ations for that circumstance).
155. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 493 (2020).
156. See id.; see also David L Hudson, Jr., New Formal Ethics Opinion Gives Additional Guidance on
Harassment and Discrimination, A.B.A. J. (July 15, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new-
formal-ethics-opinion-gives-additional-guidance-on-harassment-and-discrimination# [https://perma.cc/9YKN-
D72V] (providing a summary on the key features of the opinion).
157. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, supra note 155, at 14.
378
CATCHING UNFITNESS
provision, to effectively regulate discrimination, harassment, and related miscon-
duct in the profession.
III. EFFECTUATING THE PURPOSES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Because this Article identifies the ways in which the FTP provision has been
used by state disciplinary authorities and evaluates its utility as a tool to curb law-
yer misconduct, it is important to provide a theoretical framework for understand-
ing and evaluating ethical rules. This is a difficult task, both because disciplinary
authorities rarely discuss their objectives in creating ethical codes158 and because
relatively little scholarly attention has been given to the subject.159 This Part
begins to fill that gap, as it is the first to identify guiding principles that can be
used to systematically evaluate the extent to which a particular ethics rule effec-
tively promotes the purposes for which it was adopted.
A. PURPOSES OF LAWYER DISCIPLINE
The purposes of lawyer discipline are inextricably tied to the profession's tra-
dition of self-regulation. As public scrutiny of attorneys increased in the early
twentieth century, those within the profession turned their attention to the devel-
opment of ethical codes to preserve the profession's stature and to resist calls for
external regulation.160 Almost invariably, disciplinary authorities identify four
interrelated purposes of lawyer discipline: (1) protecting the public, (2) promot-
ing the administration of justice, (3) maintaining the integrity and high standards
associated with the profession, and (4) instilling and preserving public confidence
in the profession.161 Each of these purposes will be discussed in turn.
1. PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
Because lawyers interact with a number of constituents whose legal rights and
livelihoods might be affected by misconduct, one of the central goals of lawyer
158. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 675
(2003) (noting that courts and disciplinary authorities do not specifically identify the purposes of lawyer disci-
pline but advocating that they do so).
159. For a scholarly discussion of these issues, see generally Jon J. Lee, Double Standards: An Empirical
Study of Patent and Trademark Discipline, 61 B.C.L. REv. 1613 (2020) (exploring purposes of lawyer disci-
pline and sanctions and applying them in the context of the work of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).
160. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REv. 1147, 1162 (2009) (arguing that
attorneys cling on to a myth of self-regulation that is not based in the reality of the other types of regulation on
attorney misconduct and simultaneously creates a sense among the public that attorney misconduct is not being
properly regulated).
161. See Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 934-37 (1994) (identifying how courts have described the purposes of lawyer disci-
pline); Stephen G. Bene, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys?: An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary
Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 907, 912-13 (1991) (identifying purposes of lawyer discipline and arguing that
there is consistency among reported bar discipline cases in citing one or more of these purposes).
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discipline is to protect the public against lawyers who cannot be entrusted with such a
responsibility.162 While the term "public" is subject to both narrow and broad interpre-
tations, disciplinary authorities often do not identify how they conceive of the term
when they use it as a justification for sanctioning an attorney.163 While the term
certainly encompasses those clients who have been directly affected by the miscon-
duct that is the subject of the disciplinary action, it necessarily extends beyond those
clients-most of whom have already terminated their relationship with the attorney-
to the attorney's other clients and future clients."
But even this conception of "public" is somewhat narrow, since it focuses on
the immediate client-lawyer relationship and does not consider others who might
be harmed. Broadly conceived, the public would include people who might be
adversely affected were this attorney to repeat this misconduct (or commit other
misconduct) in the future.16 Such persons could be connected with the subject of
the lawyer's representation (such as an opposing party or opposing party's coun-
sel), but they could also be those with whom the lawyer interacts in the course of
performing the lawyer's duties (such as other attorneys or court personnel).16
Moreover, if it is assumed that disciplining one attorney has a deterrent effect on
other attorneys, the "public" could extend even further to those persons who
would have been adversely affected by other attorneys' misconduct had those
attorneys not been deterred from engaging in it. 167
2. PROMOTING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Because the legal profession has been accused by some of being overly client-
centered, disciplinary authorities have recognized the need to ensure that lawyers
are not advocating for their clients at the expense of the administration of justice.
This purpose is highlighted at the beginning of the Preamble to the Model Rules,
which states that the lawyer is "an officer of the legal system and a public citizen
having special responsibility for the quality of justice."168 It is expressly regulated
through Rule 8.4(d), which proscribes "engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice."169
162. See Zacharias, supra note 158, at 678; see also Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer
Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 50 (2007) (suggesting that protection of the public should be paramount
among the goals).
163. See Lee, supra note 159, at 1648.
164. See Janine C. Ogando, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Need for Public Protection, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 459,462 (1991).
165. Lee, supra note 159, at 1648.
166. See id.
167. Cf. Ben6, supra note 161, at 924-25 (suggesting that lawyer sanctions may have a broad deterrent
effect, while arguing that economic penalties might create an even greater incentive).
168. MODEL RULES pmbl. para. 1.
169. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(d); see also Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About he
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 17 & n. 78 (1998) (identifying the
administration of justice as one of the purposes of discipline and exploring its meaning).
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While there are a number of specific rules that address activities that may
have an adverse impact on adjudications,170 the types of activities that may
be prejudicial to the administration of justice extend beyond a court set-
ting.17 1 Indeed, the predecessor to Rule 8.4(g) appeared as a comment in con-
nection with Rule 8.4(d), suggesting that a lawyer who exhibits bias or
prejudice could be engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice under certain circumstances.17 2
3. MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY AND HIGH STANDARDS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
PROFESSION
The third purpose of lawyer discipline, maintaining the integrity and high
standards associated with the profession, stems from the notion that an effective
disciplinary system will not only successfully curb misconduct but also promote
ethical conduct in areas in which disciplinary enforcement may be difficult or
impossible.173 For this reason, lawyer disciplinary codes have always included
aspirational provisions; though initially included within canons, they now appear
interspersed within the rules and comments and identify best practices for lawyer
conduct.17 4 Although there is no expectation that these aspirational provisions will
themselves lead to discipline-indeed, the Model Rules explicitly prohibit it-
they "provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules."1"
At the same time, there is a general consensus among disciplinary authorities
that maintaining the integrity of the profession includes the regulation of at least
some misconduct that occurs outside the strict confines of the practice of law.176
What falls within this category-e.g., commission of violent crimes or failure to
pay taxes-is vigorously debated.177 According to Steven Gillers, this "rest[s] on
170. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 3.1-3.9 (disciplinary rules proscribing misconduct involving a tribunal).
171. Lee, supra note 159, at 1649 ("[T]his purpose [the administration of justice] pervades the ABA Rules
and provides a lens through which they should be understood.").
172. See supra Part II.A (discussing the regulation of bias and prejudice through Comment [3] to Rule 8.4
(d)).
173. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639, 644-45
(1981) (noting that ethics rules are only beneficial where they differ from prevailing law and morality and hold
members to a higher standard of conduct than would otherwise be required of them). See generally David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992) (linking effective professional regula-
tion to lawyer independence).
174. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.5(b) (providing what lawyers should do with regard to the communication
of fees); see also Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case
Study of the Impact of Undernenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOwA L. REV. 971, 1012-13 (2002) (explaining
the differences between unenforceable and unenforced professional rules).
175. MODEL RULES scope para. 14.
176. See Stephen Gillers, Lowering the Bar: How Lawyer Discipline in New York Fails to Protect the
Public, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 485,495 (2014).
177. See id. at 517-27 (describing disparities in New York regarding the sanctioning of misconduct falling
outside the practice of law); see also C. Lorene Brown, Other Misconduct Warranting Discipline, 17 J. LEGAL
PROF. 199, 205 (1992) (identifying a test adopted by some courts that there must be "a nexus between the law-
yer's conduct and those characteristics relevant to the practice of law").
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the proposition that the [discipline] is needed to tell the public that some conduct
renders a person unfit to be a licensed lawyer egardless of how she would behave
in practice."178 Fittingly, the ABA's general misconduct rule that contains the
catchall provisions, Rule 8.4, lies within the section entitled "Maintaining The
Integrity Of The Profession."179
4. INSTILLING AND PRESERVING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PROFESSION
The legal profession has a public perception problem. To be sure, this problem
has been fueled by highly publicized incidents of lawyer misconduct such as the
ones included in the Introduction.180 It is also maintained by the profession's in-
sistence on self-regulation, which leads some to claim that the disciplinary system
is overly protective of lawyers at the expense of those who might be affected by
their actions.181 This skepticism is compounded by the fact that most disciplinary
adjudications are conducted in secret, leading some to argue for increased trans-
parency and public involvement in the process.8 2
There is much more that could be done, but states have begun posting discipli-
nary statistics and detailed information about individual lawyer discipline on
public-facing websites.183 Furthermore, some states have undertaken efforts to
promote more consistency and uniformity in the imposition of discipline and
sanctions imposed.184 Increasingly, state authorities are methodically applying the
ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement and ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions in determining appropriate sanctions and considering
the discipline imposed in prior cases to be binding or persuasive authority.185
B. EVALUATING DISCIPLINARY RULES: GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Although several scholars have criticized the promulgation of disciplinary
rules and their administration on the grounds of regulator inaction, ineffective
178. Gillers, supra note 176, at 495.
179. MODEL RULES R. 8.4.
180. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
181. See Allen Blumenthal, Attorney Self-Regulation, Consumer Protection, and the Future of the Legal
Profession, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 6, 7-8 (Winter 1993/1994); Zacharias, supra note 160, at 1185-86.
182. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 162, at 49-50 (recommending transparency for a number of reasons,
including public perception).
183. See id. at 20-21 (noting the strides made in some states but arguing that more can be done to make
details of discipline more widely available).
184. See Gillers, supra note 176, at 493-94 (noting that some states have begun using the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions but New York has not, which might explain its lack of consistency in sanctions).
185. See, e.g., OHIO BD. OF PROF'L CONDUCT, DISCIPLINARY HANDBOOK: VOLUME XIII (2019), https://
544c0861-b216-4524-b3df-27c05c4d0e47.filesusr.com/ugd/c6a571_7123a39663ba4b09922a2b6aa646d5a6.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JS4C-75CT] (compiling and categorizing Ohio disciplinary sanctions imposed in 2019,
in which each decision lists the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the relevant cases upon
which the sanction was based).
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rule drafting, and inconsistently-imposed discipline,186 there has been no compre-
hensive discussion in the scholarly literature of what makes a "good" ethical rule.
In some respects this is not surprising because it is difficult to evaluate the opera-
tion of an ethical rule without making a normative judgment on the wisdom of
the rule itself.187 Nevertheless, this undertaking is a valuable one for law reform
efforts, because it can provide a mechanism for deciding whether a current rule is
fulfilling its purpose or determining whether a proposed rule should be adopted.
This Article identifies six guiding principles for evaluating a disciplinary rule.
This list does not purport to be exhaustive, but it is a starting point for future
work in this area.
1. PRINCIPLE #1: WHETHER THE RULE FURTHERS REGULATORY OBJECTIVES
In some ways, it is self-evident that an effective rule is one that fulfills its
regulatory objectives. Unfortunately, disciplinary authorities historically have
neglected to explicitly identify their objectives or prioritize among competing
objectives, which hinders the effective administration and enforcement of
adopted rules. 188 Commonly, disciplinary authorities merely restate some combi-
nation of the four purposes of lawyer discipline discussed in Part III.A-protect-
ing the public, promoting the administration of justice, maintaining the integrity
of the profession, and instilling public confidence in the profession-without pro-
viding additional detail on what those phrases mean or how they might apply in
the context of a specific rule.189 Nevertheless, to the extent that disciplinary
authorities do identify a specific regulatory objective, a good rule would both reg-
ulate conduct that undercuts that objective and affirmatively promote conduct
that furthers it. 190
2. PRINCIPLE #2: WHETHER THE RULE PROMOTES RELEVANT CONSTITUENT INTERESTS
Rules may be directed at one or more constituents: a lawyer's current or future
clients, other people who might be affected by a lawyer's conduct, legal systems
such as tribunals and legislatures, or the legal profession and those who regulate
it.191 In considering whether different types of lawyer misconduct should be regu-
lated by disciplinary authorities versus other enforcement systems, David Wilkins has
186. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 173 (taking to task the effectiveness of the Model Rules in regulating lawyer
misconduct and promoting ethical behavior).
187. Cf. Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (And Five Best)
American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (discussing the criteria for evaluating a criminal code
and noting the need to avoid normative judgments).
188. See Zacharias, supra note 158, at 744-75 (noting this deficiency and proposing that disciplinary
authorities should clearly identify objectives in order to more effectively promulgate and administer rules).
189. See id. at 677-78 & n.1 (compiling court opinions that restate one or more of these broad rationales).
190. See Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 85 ("The design of an effective system for regulating lawyers must
take into account the justifications for and objectives of such regulation.").
191. See id. at 85-87.
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argued persuasively that such a decision should be made in light of the relevant inter-
ests at stake and how such interests would be most effectively vindicated.192 Likewise,
the effectiveness of an existing or proposed rule may be judged according to how well
it promotes the interests of those constituents it purports to protect.193
3. PRINCIPLE #3: WHETHER THE RULE FILLS A REGULATORY GAP
Disciplinary enforcement is just one of many ways in which lawyer miscon-
duct may be regulated and sanctioned. There are a host of other ways, from infor-
mal court admonishments and Rule 11 sanctions, to legal malpractice actions and
criminal prosecutions.194 The ABA, for its part, has included among its mitigating
factors for sanctions the "imposition of other penalties or sanctions," which sug-
gests that the administration of professional discipline should take into account
the existence of other regulatory mechanisms.195
There are two consequences of this recognition. First, certain regulatory mecha-
nisms are best suited to handle different types of misconduct.196 For example, an
informal court admonishment regulates a single instance of a lawyer making an off-
hand inflammatory remark during a trial more efficiently than would a disciplinary
proceeding. On the other hand, a disciplinary proceeding may regulate a lawyer
who has neglected the cases of several clients more effectively than would a civil
lawsuit, given the higher costs and burdens associated with malpractice actions.1 97
Second, ethics rules should be setting standards of conduct that are higher than
those set for members of the general public, rather than merely setting the same-or
lower-standards.198 The legal profession comes under fire in this regard because of
the perception that its ethics codes are the product of self-serving behavior and often
do not proscribe conduct that the public would consider unethical.199
4. PRINCIPLE #4: WHETHER THE RULE SERVES A DISTINCT FUNCTION
Whereas the third principle concerns whether an ethics rule is an appropriate
mechanism for regulating a particular type of misconduct, the fourth principle
concerns whether the rule serves a distinct function in relation to other ethics
rules. This principle is a corollary of the rule against surplusage, a widely-
192. See Wilkins, supra note 173, at 815-18.
193. See Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 100.
194. Cf. Zacharias, supra note 160, at 1181-82 (positing that the perpetuation of the myth of self-regulation
leads disciplinary authorities to not fully consider alternative mechanisms for regulating misconduct).
195. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) [herein-
after DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT].
196. See Wilkins, supra note 173, at 847-49 (discussing the advantages and limitations of different enforce-
ment mechanisms).
197. See Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 100-01.
198. Abel, supra note 173, at 644-45.
199. See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the




followed canon of statutory interpretation that provides that "[i]f possible, every
word and every provision is to be given effect.''20 0 It follows that an ethics rule
should not be duplicative of another rule (or set of rules), for such duplication
could lead those administering the subject rule to erroneously assume that it must
have a different meaning than the other rule or rules.201 Indeed, the ABA House
of Delegates has appeared to apply this principle at times when deciding whether
to adopt or eliminate a provision-including when it declined to retain the FTP
provision in the transition to the Model Rules.20 2
At the same time, lawyer misconduct may violate multiple rules. For that rea-
son, it must be clear how a particular rule relates to other, related rules so that
lawyers have adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and to ensure that dis-
ciplinary authorities can effectively administer the rule.20 3
5. PRINCIPLE #5: WHETHER THE RULE CAN BE APPLIED CONSISTENTLY
One of the biggest criticisms of lawyer discipline is that it is not applied in a consist-
ent manner; that is, that the same types of misconduct are treated differently by the same
disciplinary authority.2" While the ABA has promulgated its Model Rules for Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement and related guidance to promote uniformity and consistency
in the imposition of sanctions, those standards are written at a high level of generality
and do not fully address the concerns that arise in trying to administer discipline.205 But
consistency is critical to ensure that lawyers are on notice of the types of actions that are
proscribed so they can conduct themselves accordingly.206 This is especially true when
it comes to ethics rules such as the catchall provisions, which are necessarily written in a
more general fashion; a disciplinary authority may choose not to enforce a rule or-
perhaps even worse-enforce it in instances when it is not warranted.207
Consequently, a good ethical rule is one that can be consistently applied, either
based on the language of the rule itself or in combination with comments, formal
ethics opinions, or similar guidance on its reach.
200. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174
(2012).
201. Cf. Robinson, supra note 187, at 11 (explaining the concept in the context of criminal codes).
202. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
203. Cf. Robinson, supra note 187, at 11 (discussing the problems that may arise when there is ambiguity in
criminal codes).
204. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 176, at 503-15 (discussing the differences among the New York depart-
ments in sanctioning attorneys).
205. See DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10 (containing a laundry list of relevant considerations, but not
put in the context of particular rules or factual scenarios).
206. Dzienkowski, supra note 35, at 85 (identifying consistency as an important goal in rule design so that
lawyers can make consistent decisions when confronted with ethical dilemmas).
207. Cf. Zacharias, supra note 174, at 1012-14 (discussing the problems of the underenforcement or selec-
tive enforcement of ethics rules).
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6. PRINCIPLE #6: WHETHER THE RULE IS EFFECTIVELY TAILORED
The final principle, whether an ethics rule is effectively tailored, has two comple-
mentary aspects. On one hand, a rule should not sweep in conduct that should not be
the subject of a disciplinary action.208 Although one can argue that a disciplinary
authority would likely decline to prosecute such a case were it to arise, the mere threat
of such an action can itself undermine the rule's effectiveness-as has been seen in
the controversy over Rule 8.4(g).209 There might be a variety of reasons that particular
conduct should not be the subject of a disciplinary action; for example, it may be con-
stitutionally protected or unconnected to the lawyer's ability to practice law.
On the other hand, a rule should not be written so that it allows an unscrupulous attor-
ney to evade its reach despite having engaged in unethical conduct.210 An apt example is
Rule 1.8(b), which regulates an attorney's use of information learned in the course of rep-
resenting a client. Under the provision, an attorney can use confidential information with-
out the client's informed consent provided that the use does not "disadvantage" the
client.2n Such uses may even include taking advantage of (and profiting from) a business
opportunity that was learned of during the representation, at least when the client had al-
ready decided against taking the opportunity.212 Nevertheless, an attorney who acts in
such a manner, irrespective of the rules, breaches the client's trust and confidence.213
Rules may enable evasive behavior because they have been written in a self-
interested manner, as has Rule 1.8(b), or because they fail to keep up with the
changing nature of the legal profession or our evolving understanding of the types
of conduct that are antithetical to the ethical practice of law.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE FITNESS-TO-PRACTICE PROVISION
With this theoretical framework in place, this Article turns to the question of
whether the FTP provision can be used to effectively regulate misconduct that
falls outside the traditional ethical rules-including, but not limited to, the regula-
tion of discrimination and harassment. To answer this question, the author under-
took a comprehensive study of the seven states that have retained a version of the
FTP provision, analyzing all publicly-available disciplinary actions in those
states between January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2019.
This Part begins with a discussion of the scope of the study, including the
identification of the relevant provisions in each state and how they are situated
208. See Zacharias, supra note 158, at 730-32 (explaining that rule-makers should refrain from drafting
rules that could be applied to regulate conduct that was not intended to be subject to a disciplinary action, or at
least make it clear that such use was not intended).
209. See supra Part II.C.
210. Abel, supra note 173, at 642-43 (claiming that this activity is quite common).
211. MODEL RULES R. 1.8(b).
212. MODEL RuLEs R. 1.8(b) cmt. 5.
213. See Sande Buhai, Lawyers as Fiduciaries, 53 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 553, 580 (2009) (arguing that Rule




within the corresponding disciplinary codes. It then explains the methodology
employed, including the strategic coding and analytical decisions made to facili-
tate analysis across states. Next, the results are presented along with the infer-
ences that may be drawn about how the FTP provision is being used by
disciplinary authorities. Violations of the FTP provision fall into one or more of
nine categories, which are described and analyzed in greater detail.
A. STUDY SCOPE
Seven states have retained some version of the FTP provision in their profes-
sional codes. The relevant provision for each state is included in Table 1.
TABLE 1: STATES THAT HAVE RETAINED THE FTP PROVISION
Alabama 8.4(g): engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law2
Colorado 8.4(h): engage in any conduct that directly, intentionally,
and wrongfully harms others and that adversely reflects
on a lawyer's fitness to practice law 1
Kansas 8.4(g): engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law2 16
Massachusetts 8.4(h): engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on
his or her fitness to practice law"1
New York 8.4(h): engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer2 18
Ohio 8.4(h): engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law2 19
Washington 8.4(n): engage in conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law220
214. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (ALA. ST. BAR 2020) [hereinafter ALA. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT].
215. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (COLO. BAR ASS'N 2020) [hereinafter COLO. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT].
216. KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) (KAN. BAR ASS'N 2020).
217. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (MASS. BAR ASS'N 2020) [hereinafter MASS. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT].
218. N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h) (N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N 2020).
219. OHIo RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h).
220. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(n) (WASH. ST. BAR ASS'N 2020) [hereinafter WASH. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT].
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Two preliminary issues arise in the administration of the FTP provision. The first
issue is whether the relevant conduct must also be proscribed by another rule. This
issue warrants consideration because some believe that catchall provisions should not
"pile on" disciplinary rule violations, but rather should operate only when there is a gap
in the specific rules. 1 On the other hand, others believe that catchall provisions should
apply only when more specific rules also proscribe the misconduct at issue to ensure
that the lawyer is on notice that he behavior may be sanctionable.2 " The second issue
is whether there must be a showing that the lawyer had a particular mental state in per-
forming the conduct. As evidenced by the debate over Rule 8.4(g), some believe that
these types of rules should apply only to conduct that was done intentionally or know-
ingly, rather than merely negligently or without showing any particular mental state.2
The FTP provisions themselves shed little light on these issues. The versions
adopted in five of the states-Alabama, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York, and
Ohio-are substantially the same. They do not make mention of a requisite mental
state. Based on their similarities, one might expect disciplinary authorities to admin-
ister them similarly. The Washington version omits the word "other" as a modifier
of "conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law." This omission strongly sug-
gests that in Washington the conduct at issue may also violate another specific provi-
sion of its code. Colorado's FTP provision is the most distinct, in that it requires that
the conduct "directly, intentionally, and wrongfully harm[] others."2  This language
both limits the application of the provision to intentionally harmful conduct and
requires a showing of harm to another person, which will necessarily exclude a wide
variety of lawyer misconduct that might adversely reflect on a lawyer's fitness to
practice but that did not result in harm to another person.
Neither disciplinary administrators nor courts in most states have provided
much clarity on these issues. In Alabama, New York, and Washington, there has
been no substantive discussion of the FTP provision outside its application in par-
ticular disciplinary matters. A Kansas Supreme Court decision indicates that mis-
conduct in its state "may" violate both the FTP provision and other disciplinary
rules simultaneously, but the decision does not suggest that i must do so.226 One
Massachusetts decision discusses the state's FTP provision in depth, in support of
221. See Hal R. Lieberman & Harvey Prager, New York's Catch-All Rule: Is It Needed? Part 1, NYLER
Archive, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REPORTER, http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/new-yorks-catch-all-rule-is-it-
needed-part-1/ [https://perma.cc/SE84-7X9Q] (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) (discussing New York's frequently
cumulative use of FTP provision and positing that it should be eliminated).
222. See In re The Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, No. BD-2012-043, at 4 (Mass. 2012) (Spina J.,
single justice), available at https://bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bdl2-043.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VR3N-VY76] (expressing concerns in finding an FTP-provision violation where there was not a violation of
another ethics rule or similar rule or policy).
223. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1 (2010) (framing the debate over whether lawyer rules without a specified mental state nevertheless
should require proof of a particular mental state).
224. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(n).
225. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(h).
226. See In re Carson, 991 P.2d 896, 900-01 (Kan. 1999).
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its dismissal of a petition for discipline that had been based on a single violation
of the FTP provision.22 7 In the opinion, the judge expresses "reluctan[ce] to find a
violation of [the FTP provision] unless the respondent can be fairly said to have
been on notice that her conduct was wrong."22 Although the opinion does not
require that another ethics rule be violated for there to be a violation of the FTP
provision, it posits that there would need to be either the violation of another
ethics rule or a violation of a similar type of rule or policy, such as a consistently-
enforced law firm policy. 229
Colorado and Ohio provide the clearest guidance on the application and limits
of their versions of the FTP provision. The Supreme Court of Colorado has stated
that its provision covers only conduct that is not subject to another ethics rule.2 30
This means that although a lawyer could be sanctioned in Colorado based on vio-
lations of multiple rules, the lawyer will violate the FTP provision only if some
part of the misconduct is not proscribed by another rule.231 In Ohio, by contrast,
lawyers can violate the FTP provision in two types of circumstances:
(1) situations in which a lawyer's conduct in violation of other more specific
rules is so egregious that i adversely reflects on [the lawyer's] fitness to prac-
tice law and (2) cases in which there is no specific provision prohibiting a law-
yer's conduct, yet ... it adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.23 2
The Supreme Court of Ohio articulated this standard in its 2013 decision
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, rejecting an argument that the FTP provision
could be violated automatically by virtue of other rule violations.233
Finally, it is necessary to situate the FTP provision in each state within the broader
context of the state's other catchall provisions. All of the states in this study have
versions of the crime provision, fraud provision, and administration-of-justice provi-
sion.234 Furthermore, three states have additional catchall provisions of conse-
quence. Ohio maintains a provision proscribing, while in a "professional capacity[,]
discrimination prohibited by law because of race, color, religion, age, gender, sexual
orientation, national origin, marital status, or disability." 235 Colorado has a some-
what similar provision; while it is limited to conduct occurring during the "represen-
tation of a client," the provision does not require that the misconduct be prohibited
227. See In re The Matter of the Discipline of an Attorney, No. BD-2012-043, at 4-5 (Mass. 2012) (Spina
J., single justice).
228. Id. at 4.
229. See id. at 4-5.
230. See In re Thompson, 991 P.2d 820, 822 n. 1 (Colo. 1999) (stating that "[w]hen a lawyer violates a rule
other than 8.4(h), it is not necessary or, in a strict sense, proper to charge a violation of 8.4(h)").
231. See id. (assuming there was no separate violation of Rule 8.4(h) but concluding that any such error was
harmless because the lawyer had violated other ules that led to the imposed sanction).
232. Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 997 N.E.2d 500,505-06 (Ohio 2013).
233. See id.
234. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
235. OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
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by law.236 After the ABA's adoption of Rule 8.4(g), Colorado adopted a provision
proscribing "conduct the lawyer knows or reasonably should know constitutes sex-
ual harassment where the conduct occurs in connection with the lawyer's professio-
nal activities."237 Because this provision was not adopted until September 2019,
there are no disciplinary cases in this study that include a violation of that provision.
Washington's catchall provisions are unique. Along with the traditional catch-
all provisions and the FTP provision, Washington has six additional catchall pro-
visions. They proscribe, among other things, engaging in discriminatory acts or
manifesting bias or prejudice on the basis of one of several protected classifica-
tions; willfully disobeying or violating court orders; committing acts, whether
criminal in nature or not, involving moral turpitude or corruption or that "reflect[]
disregard for the rule of law"; and committing acts that "violate[] his or her oath
as an attorney. '238 In addition to examining the use of the FTP provision, this
study tracks the administration of state-specific catchall provisions in order to
understand their relationship to the FTP provision.
B. METHODOLOGY
After identifying the relevant states and provisions, the next task was to estab-
lish the parameters for the study and compile all available disciplinary actions for
the time period of interest. Other than New York, which organizes its discipline
by department,23 9 each state maintains a single central online repository of its dis-
ciplinary actions.2 40 However, the states vary considerably regarding the types of
sanctions that are publicly accessible and the level of detail provided. Of the
236. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
237. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(i); see also Jessica Yates, Sexual Harassment and the Rules
of Professional Conduct, COLO. SUP. CT. OFF. OF ATT'Y REG. COUNSEL, http://coloradosupremecourt.com/
Newsletters/March20l9/Proposed%2ORule%208.4(i).htm [https://perma.cc/QXJ3-PKPC] (last visited June 16,
2020) (discussing Colorado's then-proposed rule).
238. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4.
239. See Complaints About Attorneys, N.Y. APP. DIv., FIRST JUD. DEP'T, http://ww2.nycourts.gov/
attorneys/grievance/complaints.shtml [https://perma.cc/VGD2-CNAD] (last visited June 16, 2020) (explaining
that discipline is administered by department rather than by the N.Y. Unified State Court System and providing
links to each department); see also, e.g., First Judicial Department, Attorney Grievance Committee, N.Y. APP.
DIv., FIR JUD. DEP'T, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/adl/Committees&Programs/DDC/index.shtml [https://
perma.cc/YJW6-KQRG] (last visited June 16, 2020); Fourth Judicial Department, Fourth Department
Decisions, N.Y. UNIFIED ST. CT. SYS, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad4/Clerk/Decisions/ [https://perma.cc/
TQJ7-ES7B] (last visited June 16, 2020).
240. Disciplinary Decisions, MASS. BD. BAR OVERSEERS, https://www.massbbo.org/Decisions [https://
perma.cc/8WML-6CF4] (last visited June 16, 2020); Disciplinary History, ALA. ST. BAR, https://www.alabar.
org/office-of-general-counsel/disciplinary-history/ (last visited June 16, 2020); Discipline Notices, MYWSBA,
https://www.mywsba.org/personifyebusiness/DisciplineNoticeDirectory.aspx [https://perma.cc/6HDN-L92H]
(last visited June 16, 2020); Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, COLO. SUP. CT., https://www.
coloradosupremecourt.com/PDJ/PDJDecisions.asp [https://perma.cc/N43P-PBHU] (last visited June 16,
2020); Ohio Disciplinary Decisions, OHIO BD. PROF'L CONDUCT, https://www.bpc.ohio.gov/ohio-disciplinary-
decisions [https://perma.cc/9UXY-5GKH] (last visited June 16, 2020); Published Attorney Discipline Cases,
Kan. Jud. Branch, https://www.kscourts.org/Attorneys/Published-Attorney-Discipline-Cases [https://perma.cc/
XAR7-C9ZN] (last visited June 16, 2020).
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seven states, only Alabama and Massachusetts include publicly-accessible infor-
mation about the bases of privately-imposed sanctions.241 Whereas Alabama pro-
vides only a short summary of a lawyer's misconduct and identifies what rules
were violated in aggregate, Ohio compiles extensive information about each pub-
lic sanction, including detailed summaries of the lawyer's misconduct, explana-
tions of which specific aspects of the lawyer's conduct violated particular rules,
and findings regarding aggravating and mitigating factors.24 2 To address these
disparities, this study identified common data points across the disciplinary opin-
ions in all states but also compiled additional data (such as on aggravating and
mitigating factors) from those states that routinely included it.
To isolate the disciplinary actions for this study, the first step was to identify the
appropriate timeframe for consideration. The study's objectives and the integrity of
the data militated in favor of the eight-year time period between January 1, 2012,
and December 31, 2019. Because this study would be examining how the FTP pro-
vision is currently used by state authorities, the time frame had to be long enough to
permit a robust analysis for each state but not extend back so far that it would reflect
outdated practices. Moreover, in many states, data was missing or suspect before
2012 and/or after 2019, further supporting the use of the eight-year timeframe.243
The next step was to determine what types of disciplinary actions to include.
Because the study focuses on the FTP provision and its relation to other rules, dis-
ciplinary actions were included only if they identify one or more rules that pro-
vided the basis of the sanction. This excluded a number of disciplinary actions
from New York, for example, which automatically disbars attorneys convicted of
felonies and implements a different procedure for disciplining attorneys con-
victed of other serious crimes.244 Nevertheless, this delineation is a logical one
given the nature of the study, for it would have been impossible to predict what
rules a disciplinary authority would have cited in those actions. The study also
excluded decisions that imposed reciprocal discipline, which is discipline in a
subject state based on the lawyer having been disciplined by another authority.
The study excluded such decisions because they were often based on the rules
that the other authority had cited in its disciplinary opinion, rather than on what
rules the subject state would have used had the investigation originated there.
241. Both state websites include a dropdown to select the type of discipline imposed, which includes private
sanctions. See ALA. ST. BAR, supra note 240; MASS. BD. BAR OVERSEERS, supra note 240.
242. See, e.g., OHIO BD. OF PROF'L CONDUCT, supra note 185 (compiling and categorizing Ohio disciplinary
sanctions imposed in 2019).
243. For example, Alabama had 91 publicly-available disciplinary actions in 2012, but only 11 in 2011 and
3 in 2010. See ALA. ST. BAR, supra note 240.
244. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4)(a) (McKinney 2013) (providing that lawyers "who shall be convicted of a
felony... shall upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney"); see also Lazar Emanuel, Felonies & Serious
Crimes in Lawyer Discipline, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REP. (Aug. 2002), http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/
felonies-serious-crimes-in-lawyer-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/NP55-UE8T] (discussing the procedures
governing attorneys convicted of felonies and serious crimes).
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Table 2 identifies the numbers of disciplinary actions in this study. In total, the study
examines 2,706 actions, 2,294 of which imposed public sanctions and 412 of which
imposed private sanctions. The only apparent outlier state was New York, in which
there were 140 disciplinary actions. There are two explanations for this low number. As
noted, New York's approach toward felonies and serious crimes necessarily excludes a
large number of actions from consideration. Second, only two of its four departments-
the First and Fourth departments-make their disciplinary actions widely accessible.
Accordingly, this study can draw definitive conclusions on the workings of only those
departments. Nevertheless, the study did not find significant differences in disciplinary
patterns between the First and Fourth departments, and it is reasonable to believe that
similar patterns would appear in the Second and Third departments.













245. As of May 28, 2020, neither the Second Department nor the Third Department provided information
on specific disciplinary actions. See Attorney Grievance Committee, N.Y. APP. DIv., THIRD JUD. DEP'T, http://
www.nycourts.gov/ad3/AGC/Index.html [https://perma.cc/7W85-4UTP] (including placeholder links to
committee decisions) (last visited June 16, 2020); Attorney Matters, N.Y. APP. DIVISION, SECOND JUD. DEP'T,
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/attomeymatters ComplaintAboutaLawyer.shtml#Grievance_Committees
[https://perma.cc/J92D-D22S] (last visited June 16, 2020).
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After collecting and scrubbing the data, each disciplinary action was reviewed
and coded according to the state rendering the decision, year of decision, discipli-
nary rule(s) violated, sanction type, and sanction length (if applicable). When the
general misconduct rule, Rule 8.4, was violated, the specific catchall provisions
were also noted. Finally, a summary of the relevant misconduct was created so
that commonly occurring fact patterns could be identified.
The study employed additional measures to facilitate comparisons among states.
With regard to sanctions, all states use at least one type of public expressive (i.e. non-
incapacitating) sanction, whether it be labeled an admonition, reprimand, or censure.
For analysis purposes, the study characterized each of these sanctions as "expressive,"
irrespective of the differences in terminology. Kansas and Washington have two cate-
gories of expressive sanctions, rather than one. Although the two categories were com-
bined for all cross-state comparisons, they were disaggregated when conducting state-
specific analyses. Suspensions that were for one year or less were categorized as
"short," while suspensions that exceeded one year were categorized as "long."
C. OVERALL RESULTS
As an initial matter, the study calculated the incidence rates of FTP-provision
violations for all publicly-imposed sanctions in each state. As Figure 1 illustrates,
there is a vast discrepancy among states in how often the FTP provision is cited
as a basis for discipline. Although the average rate among all states is 36.2%, it
ranges from a nearly non-existent rate of 1.0% in Colorado to a nearly ubiquitous
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FIGURE 1: Incidence rates of FTP violations in publicly-imposed discipline.
Based on these data alone, there are four natural groupings according to how
often disciplinary authorities cite the FTP provision: (1) nearly all the time (New
York), (2) a majority of the time (Alabama and Massachusetts), (3) some of the
time (Ohio and Kansas), and (4) almost never (Washington and Colorado). Only
the rate in Colorado appears to be explainable based on what is known about how
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state disciplinary authorities administer the FTP provision. As discussed in Part
IV.A, Colorado authorities are permitted to find an FTP violation only where the
conduct at issue does not simultaneously violate another rule.2 46 Consequently,
one would expect far fewer violations in Colorado than in other states, where dis-
ciplinary authorities ostensibly may find violations of both the FTP provision and
other disciplinary rules based on the same misconduct.
Even though there was less accessible information on private sanctions,
Alabama and Massachusetts provided enough detail on such sanctions to permit
analysis of them. As Figure 2 indicates, both states cite FTP-provision violations
in the majority of their publicly-imposed sanctions (solid bars), but there is a
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FIGURE 2: Incidence rates of FTP violations in Alabama and Massachusetts.
Although the incidence rates of FTP-provision violations are lower for
privately-imposed sanctions in both states, the significantly higher rate in
Alabama (38.1% vs. 4.7%) is counterintuitive given the nature of the FTP
provision. Because the relevant misconduct should "reflect[] adversely on
[the attorney's] fitness to practice law,"247 one would expect that it would
almost invariably result in a publicly-imposed sanction of some type. Public
discipline alerts members of the public about the conduct at issue so they can
make decisions about representation or, at the very least, watch for signs that
the conduct may recur.248
246. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the differences between Colorado and other states in this regard).
247. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g).
248. See Levin, supra note 162, at 49-50 (discussing benefits to the public of having increased transparency
in disciplinary actions).
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Next, the study calculated the incidence rates of FTP-provision violations for
each state over time. For the most part, no clear trends emerged in the longitudinal
data.249 However, there was a sharp decline in FTP-provision violations in Ohio, as
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FIGURE 3: Incidence rates of FTP violations in Ohio over time.
Examining the content of the Ohio disciplinary opinions themselves, no
clear explanation appeared for the dramatic decline after 2014. However,
the precipitous drop may have resulted from the issuance of the Bricker de-
cision in late 2013, in which the Supreme Court of Ohio delineated the two
types of conduct that may give rise to a FTP-provision violation: conduct
that is particularly egregious and conduct that does not give rise to another
rule violation.25 1 Although the Bricker opinion did not suggest that discipli-
nary authorities had been improperly sanctioning attorneys for violations of
the FTP provision, it is rational to suppose that the opinion led to a change
in the investigatory and disciplinary processes. This likely would not fully
show up until 2015, given the time required for such changes to be
implemented.25 2
Table 3 provides information on how often states cited the FTP provision as
the sole basis of discipline, which will be referred to as "single FTP violations."
249. Other than in Ohio, there were no statistically significant correlations between the age of the discipli-
nary action and the likelihood that it would include a violation of the state's FTP provision.
250. See infra Figure 3.
251. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 997 N.E.2d 500, 505-06 (Ohio 2013).
252. See Lawyer Ethics & Discipline, OHIO ST. BAR Ass'N, https://www.ohiobar.org/public-resources/
about-attorneys/lawyer-ethics-discipline/ [https://perma.cc/D3LM-XSP6] (last visited June 16, 2020)
(discussing the steps involved in the disciplinary process in Ohio).
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Only Ohio and Alabama have more than ten such disciplinary actions, and even
in those states they comprise a relatively small percentage of the total number of
FTP-provision violations.2 53
TABLE 3: FREQUENCY OF SINGLE FTP VIOLATIONS
Alabama 11 245 4.5%
Colorado 1 4 25.0%
Kansas 1 24 4.2%
Massachusetts 2 332 0.6%
New York 1 128 0.8%
Ohio 13 167 7.8%
Washington 0 16 0.0%
Total 29 916 3.2%
While at first glance these results might suggest hat the FTP provision is
of marginal significance, limitations in the data likely affect these results.
As discussed in the methodology section, several states do not identify pre-
cisely which aspects of a lawyer's conduct violate particular rules; instead,
they summarize the misconduct and provide an aggregate list of violated
rules.25 4 As explored later in this Article, it is common for the FTP provi-
sion to be the sole rule violated in connection with one or more aspects of a
lawyer's conduct, but for there to be other aspects of the lawyer's conduct
that violated other rules.
Although the frequency of FTP-provision violations provides some
insight into its use, it does not provide a complete picture. Table 4 compares
the incidence rates for several of the most commonly cited disciplinary
rules, along with the incidence rates for the FTP provision and the other
catchall provisions. When a rule is among the five most cited in a state, that
253. See infra Table 3.
254. See supra Part IV.B.
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cell is shaded and its ranking is included in parentheses.2 55 The final row contains
the average incidence rate among all rules cited as a basis for discipline.
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Several patterns emerge. First, some rules rank among the five most frequently
cited rules in all or most states. These rules-diligence, communication, safe-
keeping client property, and the prohibition on committing acts that are fraudu-
lent or deceitful-form the bedrock of lawyer norms and regularly comprise the
255. Where there are ties between the incidence rates of two or more rules, they are denoted by placing a
"-T" after the ranking.
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basis for disciplinary actions.256 Even in states in which these rules are not among
the top five, they are still well above the average incidence rate.257
Second, incidence rates for several of the catchall provisions vary consider-
ably, including the crime provision (e.g., 6% in Alabama versus 23% in
Colorado) and the administration-of-justice provision (e.g., 21% in Colorado ver-
sus 49% in Kansas).258 The other-catchall category is also especially noteworthy
because of its prevalence in Washington as a basis for discipline. Whereas most
of the other catchall provisions in other states have negligible incidence rates-
including the anti-bias provisions adopted in Ohio and Colorado-48% of
Washington's disciplinary actions include a violation of one of its six other catch-
all provisions.259 Massachusetts is the only other state having a modest percent-
age of disciplinary actions in which a state-specific catchall provision was cited;
that statistic is due to the fact that Massachusetts has a catchall provision that pro-
scribes failing to cooperate with bar counsel or disciplinary authorities.2 0 The
sheer number of catchall provisions in Washington, along with the frequency
with which they are being cited, may explain why the FTP provision is so infre-
quently used there.261 In examining the relevant disciplinary actions, it appears
that misconduct that would violate another state's FTP provision is instead being
regulated by one or more of Washington's six other catchall provisions.2 62
Third, the highest degree of variation in incidence rates among states is in the
FTP provision itself. Whereas in New York, Alabama, and Massachusetts the
FTP provision is overwhelmingly the most-frequently cited provision,263 it is
cited considerably less frequently in Ohio and Kansas and its citation rate is well
below average in Washington and Colorado.2M While some of this variation may
be explained by the existence of additional catchall provisions, such as in
Washington, or the limitations imposed in Colorado and Ohio, these circumstances
256. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Top 10 Ethics Traps, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2007), https://www.
abajournal.com/magazine/article/top_10_ethicstraps [https://perma.cc/6E5V-G7S4] (describing the top ethics
traps and how to avoid them, which include issues related to communication, diligence, safeguarding property,
and misrepresentation); Debra Cassens Weiss, These Common Mistakes Can Lead to Lawyer Ethics
Complaints, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/thesecommon_mistakes_
can_lead_tolawyer _ethicscomplaints [https://perma.cc/XF3V-VYWC] (identifying five of the most
common ethics complaints, which include communication issues, trust account problems, and false
notarizations).
257. See supra Table 4.
258. See supra Table 4.
259. No violations were found in Ohio for the time period of interest, and two violations were found in
Colorado (representing less than 1% of all actions in the state).
260. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g) ("[F]ail without good cause to cooperate with the Bar
Counsel or the Board of Bar Overseers.").
261. See supra Table 4.
262. See, e.g., In re Konat, No. 13#00008 (Wash. St. Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Bd Dec. 12, 2014), available at
https://www.mywsba.org/WebFiles/CusDocs/000000016082-0/0561.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SU9-DHSH] (issuing a
public reprimand to prosecutor who used racially charged language during trial).
263. Supra Table 4.
264. Supra Table 4.
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do not fully explain the differences. To the contrary, this high degree of variation
suggests that the FTP provision serves different purposes among the states and is
potentially regulating different types of misconduct. It is to these issues that this
Article turns.
D. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FTP PROVISION AND SANCTIONS
This section explores the role that the FTP provision plays in the public sanc-
tions that are imposed. Figure 4 displays the distribution of public sanctions in
each state for disciplinary actions in which there was a violation of the FTP provi-
sion, either by itself or in conjunction with other rules. Because there were only
four disciplinary actions in Colorado that included an FTP violation, that state
has been excluded from this part of the analysis. The distributions in Figure 4 sug-
gest that FTP-provision violations are associated with more punitive sanctions in
several states, especially Washington and Ohio.265
O3A 328% %WA IV3
OH ..
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
+Expressive Short Sspension a Long Suspension E Disbarment
FIGURE 4: Distribution of sanctions involving FTP violation.
Nearly all of Washington's disciplinary actions that included a violation of the
FTP provision resulted in disbarment (94%), indicating that the underlying mis-
conduct was among the most egregious.26 6 Likewise, 69% of Ohio's disciplinary
actions resulted in a long suspension or disbarment, while only 3% resulted in an
expressive sanction.267 But in order to more accurately assess the relationship
between the FTP provision and sanctions, additional context is required.
Table 5 presents the distributions of each type of public sanction according to
whether the state authority had cited the FTP provision as at least one of the bases
265. See infra Figure 4.
266. See supra Figure 4.
267. See supra Figure 4.
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for discipline. The "Percent Difference" column shows the percentage change in
the imposition of a particular sanction when the disciplinary authority had cited
the FTP provision; a positive percentage indicates that the sanction had been
imposed more frequently, and a negative percentage indicates that the sanction
had been imposed less frequently. Overall, Table 5 demonstrates that FTP-provi-
sion violations have an even stronger relationship with more severe sanctions
than Figure 4 suggested.268
TABLE 5: EFFECT OF FTP VIOLATION ON IMPOSED SANCTION
AL 40% 32% -21%
KS 11% 8% -23%
MA 48% 11% -78%
NY 42% 23% -46%
OH 22% 3% -86%
WA 26% 0% -100%
trn-ogSSnpensimn
State No FTP FTPIl Percent
Dilfference
AL 5% 14% 148%
KS 41% 29% -28%
MA 8% 22% 167%
NY 25% 28% 13%
OH 34% 53% 59%















268. See infra Table 5.
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Table 5 indicates that, in every state, having an FTP-provision violation signifi-
cantly increases the likelihood that the sanctioned lawyer will be disbarred.269 In
New York it seems to be a prerequisite, since all disbarments during the time pe-
riod included an FTP violation. 270 A similar trend appears for the imposition of
long suspensions, except in Kansas and Washington.271 At the other end of the
spectrum, violating the FTP provision in any state substantially reduces the likeli-
hood that the sanctioned attorney will receive an expressive sanction (ranging
from -21% to -100%).272 As was discussed with regard to the imposition of pri-
vate sanctions, the very nature of the FTP provision suggests that it should be
more strongly associated with incapacitating sanctions than with private sanc-
tions or even public expressive sanctions.
Nevertheless, it could still be the case that there are other differences in the disci-
plinary actions themselves that explain the observed variations in sanctions. To test
this hypothesis, ordinal regression models were constructed for the three states in
which there were at least 200 disciplinary actions and a 5% incidence rate for FTP-
provision violations: Alabama, Massachusetts, and Ohio.2 73 Although the FTP pro-
vision was not an independently significant predictor of the imposed sanctions in
Alabama, it was independently predictive of the imposed sanctions in both
Massachusetts and Ohio.2 74 This result remained true for both models when account-
ing for the other individual rules and the total number of rules that were violated.275
The Ohio model was even more robust, because the disciplinary actions included in-
formation on aggravating and mitigating factors and data about the disciplinary pro-
cess. Nevertheless, the FTP provision remained a strong independent predictor of
the type of sanction imposed, even when these variables were accounted for.276
These findings further support the proposition that the FTP provision is a meaningful
predictor of the severity of imposed sanctions, rather than merely being duplicative
of the other disciplinary rules or of the aggravating and mitigating factors.
269. See supra Table 5.
270. See supra Table 5.
271. See supra Table 5.
272. See supra Table 5.
273. These criteria were used to ensure robust data modeling.
274. The Psuedo R-Squares for the Massachusetts model were as follows: Cox and Snell (.543), Nagelkerke
(.568), and McFadden (.251). The FTP provision was a significant predictor at the 99.5% confidence level. The
Psuedo R-Squares for the Ohio model were as follows: Cox and Snell (.599), Nagelkerke (.654), and
McFadden (.370). The FTP provision was a significant predictor at the 99.5% confidence level.
275. Other independent predictors in the Massachusetts model included Rule 1.15 (safeguarding property),
Rule 8.4(b) (crime provision), Rule 8.4(c) (fraud provision), and the total rules violated. Other independent pre-
dictors in the Ohio model included Rule 8.4(b), Rule 8.4(c), and the total rules violated.
276. The aggravating and mitigating factors were input into the model in various ways. The final model
included a numerical value representing the difference between the number of aggravating factors and mitigat-
ing factors, because it had the strongest predictive power.
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E. TAXONOMY FOR FTP-PROVISION VIOLATIONS
Having established a relationship between FTP-provision violations and resultant
sanctions, this analysis shifts to identifying and understanding what types of miscon-
duct fall within the FTP provision. As a preliminary step toward developing a work-
ing taxonomy for FTP-provision violations, Pearson correlation coefficients were
calculated for violations of the FTP provision and the commonly cited ethics rules.
Table 6 presents these results, with statistically significant correlations denoted by
one star (significant at .05 level) or two stars (significant at .01 level, also in bold).
TABLE 6: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FTP PROVISION AND OTHER RULES
1.1 Competence .124 .035 .019 .005 .060 .127**
1.3 Diligence .102 -. 085 -. 055 .042 -. 194" .040
1.4 Communication .036 -. 180 -. 038 .040 -. 214" .033
1.5 Fees .083 .087 -.082* -. 042 -. 104* .021
1.15 Safeguarding Property .045 -. 116 .214** .101 .030 -.067
1.16 Proper Termination .029 -. 150 .081* -. 121 -. 043 -.003
8.1 Bar Cooperation .205** -. 035 .208** N/A .113* .175**
8.4(b) Crime .141* .077 .298** -. 111 .100* .119*
8.4(c) Fraud .263** -. 050 .554** .152 .248** .178**
8.4(d) Admin. of Justice .155* .107 .448** .087 .280** .120*
Bar Bar Catchall .000 N/A .189** .000 N/A .154**
Other Other Catchall .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .107*
These statistics give rise to several inferences. First, some of the highest correla-
tions appeared in Massachusetts, which may be explained in part by the apparent re-
luctance in the state to find a violation of the FTP provision without a violation of
another provision.2'" Indeed, the correlation between the FTP provision and fraud
provision in Massachusetts was extremely high at .554.278 Second, in three states
there were significant positive correlations between the FTP provision and the fraud
277. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
278. Supra Table 6.
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and bar-related provisions. There were also significant positive correlations with the
administration-of-justice provision (two states), crime provision (one state), and
Rule 1.15, the safeguarding-property rule (one state).279 Third, in Ohio, there were
significant negative correlations between the FTP provision and two rules that corre-
spond to traditional lawyering tasks (diligence and communication).2 '0 This finding
suggests that, at least in Ohio, the FTP provision may be used to sanction miscon-
duct that falls outside the traditional client-lawyer relationship.
With these insights in mind, this study reviewed every disciplinary opinion citing
a violation of the FTP provision and grouped them according to the types of miscon-
duct that pertained to the violation. Where authorities disciplined a lawyer based on
violations of multiple rules, the grouping was based on the specific aspect(s) of the
misconduct that were identified as an FTP-provision violation rather than on the law-
yer's entire course of conduct, if such information was available. This Article identi-
fies nine categories of misconduct that gave rise to FTP-provision violations:
(1) abusive conduct, including discrimination and harassment; (2) sexual misconduct;
(3) breach of trust; (4) untruthfulness; (5) inept lawyering; (6) bar missteps; (7) finan-
cial improprieties; (8) ordinary crimes; and (9) other misfeasance. Each category, to-
gether with its prevalence, is described in further detail below.
1. ABUSIVE CONDUCT, INCLUDING DISCRIMINATION AND HARASSMENT (4.3% OF ALL
FTP VIOLATIONS, 27.6% OF SINGLE FTP VIOLATIONS)
Given the discussions connected with the ABA's adoption of Rule 8.4(g), it was
not surprising to find that a number of the FTP-provision violations involved lawyers
who engaged in abusive conduct, including discrimination and harassment.281
Indeed, some of the most prominent examples cited by proponents of Rule 8.4(g)
were taken from disciplinary actions in which a state had found an FTP-provision
violation. In one such case, an Ohio attorney received a one-year suspension after he
sent a third-year law student several sexually explicit and inappropriate messages,
conditioning her future employment with his firm on her agreeing to engage in sexual
acts with him.2 82 Indeed, the three attorneys mentioned in the Introduction were sanc-
tioned for violations of the FTP provision based on conduct that fit in this category.
To be sure, some cases in this category could be covered by Rule 8.4(g) had it been
in effect in the jurisdiction because a fair reading of the fact patterns would suggest
that the conduct constituted "harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, re-
ligion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
279. Supra Table 6.
280. See supra Table 6.
281. See supra Part IIB.
282. Lake Cty. Bar Ass'n v. Mismas, 11 N.E.3d 1180, 1185-86 (Ohio 2014); see Matt Skrajner, Willoughby
Lawyer Suspended for Demanding Sexual Favors from Student He Then Hired, NEws-HERALD (June 12,
2014), https://www.news-herald.com/news/ohio/willoughby-lawyer-suspended-for-demanding-sexual-favors-
from-student-he-then-hired/ [https://perma.cc/8MPJ-84LD] (discussing the case).
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marital status or socioeconomic status."283 Sixteen of these cases involved sexual
harassment in the form of unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual
favors (e.g., sex in lieu of monetary fees), directed toward current or prospective
clients,284 law firm employees,28 5 or third parties in connection with the lawyer's
professional obligations.286 In fact, three of the four FTP-provision violations in
Colorado involved sexual harassment, capturing misconduct that otherwise might
have gone unregulated before the state's recent adoption of a specific sexual har-
assment provision.287 It is worth noting that only four disciplinary actions in the
entire study involved discrimination or harassment based on other protected
classes, such as race, national origin, or disability. These findings confirm that
sexual harassment is an ongoing problem in the profession while also calling into
question whether other forms of discrimination and harassment are occurring but
not resulting in professional discipline.
Nevertheless, this category is broader than conduct covered by Rule 8.4(g). It also
includes disciplinary actions in which an attorney engaged in abusive conduct not
involving a protected class. For example, an Alabama lawyer received a private repri-
mand for his aggressive behavior and comments toward an Alabama State Trooper in
a courtroom: he called the trooper a "dog" and "the kind of cop to shoot first and ask
questions later" and committed other acts of intimidation.288 In other instances, the
misconduct included misuse of the legal system; an example is an attorney who filed a
number of meritless lawsuits as part of a "decade-long campaign of harassment
against his ex-wife and other family members, her attorneys, and the judge presiding
in [the] divorce action."289 A number of cases involved verbal abuse of other attorneys
or court personnel, but the motivation or basis for these actions was unclear.290
Without more information, these actions would not violate Rule 8.4(g).
283. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(g).
284. People v. Berman, 2012 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 24, at *1, 2012 WL 1795074 (Colo. May 11, 2012)
(offensively touching client and making unwelcome comment about client's appearance), available at https://
www.coloradosupremecourt.com/pdj/Decisions/Berman,%20Conditional%20Admission,%2011PDJ078,5-11-
12.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y26G-PQDJ].
285. Disciplinary Counsel v. Skolnick, 104 N.E.3d 775, 776 (Ohio 2018) (repeated verbal abuse of para-
legal, calling her "stupid, dumb, fat, whorey, and b*tch"), available at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/
docs/pdf/0/2018/2018-Ohio-2990.pdf [https://perma.cc/J624-TFD6].
286. In re J. Bryan Carney, NO. BD-2016-018 (Mass. 2016) (Lowy J., single justice), available at https://
bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bd16-018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJB7-EEQZ] (sending sexually
explicit text messages to client's spouse).
287. See Yates, supra note 237 (discussing Colorado's proposed rule and gap that had previously existed).
288. ALA. ST. BAR, supra note 240 (private reprimand on Sept. 11, 2015, finding a single violation of the
state's FTP provision).
289. DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMM. OF THE N.Y. APP. DIv., FIRST JUD. DEPT., 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT 40 (2013), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/AD1/Committees&Programs/DDC/2013%2OAnnual
%20Report.pdf (summarizing the misconduct); see also In re Davey, 111 A.D.3d 207,208-10 (N.Y. App. Div.
2013) (detailing the misconduct).
290. See, e.g., ALA. ST. BAR, supra note 240 (private reprimand on Dec. 5, 2017 for threatening legal action
and "ma[king] other inappropriate statements involving the city attorney's possible employment issues, bar
license and his representation of the city").
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In fact, conduct in almost half (49%) of the thirty-nine disciplinary actions in
this category likely would not violate Rule 8.4(g) as it is currently written. This
demonstrates that, even were a state to adopt Rule 8.4(g), the FTP provision
would still be needed to regulate other abusive conduct. It is worth noting that for
all actions in this category the disciplinary authority could have found that the at-
torney had acted knowingly, if not purposefully, in committing the conduct that
was the subject of the FTP-provision violation.
2. SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2.1% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 6.9% OF SINGLE FTP
VIOLATIONS)
The sexual misconduct category includes instances of both nonconsensual and
consensual sexual contact. Whereas all instances of nonconsensual sexual contact
are included in this category, the two types of ostensibly consensual sexual con-
tact included are those in which the attorney is either (1) exploiting the client-
lawyer relationship in order to receive sexual gratification, or (2) engaging in
additional inappropriate behavior in connection with the sexual relationship.291
The prototypical example of the first type is a lawyer who exchanges legal
services for sex.292 There are other examples as well, such as the lawyer who
engaged in sexual relations with a client's spouse while the client was incarcer-
ated and the lawyer was representing the client on criminal charges.293
The second type includes lawyers who engage in lengthy "sexting" or other
inappropriate written or photographic exchanges with clients after engaging in
sexual intercourse.294 When these exchanges are unwelcome, the lawyer's mis-
conduct will also fall into the abusive-conduct category. But even when they are
not unwelcome, they fall within the sexual misconduct category.
In another highly publicized case implicating this second type, an Ohio attor-
ney engaged in an extended sexual relationship with his client during which the
two exchanged a number of texts and explicit photographs. Although they had
agreed to immediately delete the exchanges, the attorney nevertheless retained
some of the pictures on his computer. A few months later, they were caught on
video engaging in prolonged sexual contact in a courthouse conference room.
Once caught, the lawyer misrepresented the nature of their relationship and
291. MODEL RULE R. 1.8(j) proscribes consensual sexual relations between a lawyer and a client. Those cir-
cumstances, without more, do not fit in this category.
292. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 995 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Ohio 2013) (offering to make "other
arrangements" in exchange for legal work on a child custody matter); Catherine Candisky, Court Suspends
Lawyer Who Asked Client for Sex, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.dispatch.com/content/
stories/public/2013/08/28/Lawyer-suspended-for-soliciting-sex-from-client.html [https://perma.cc/7AS9-9QR9]
(describing the case).
293. Disciplinary Counsel v. Owen, 30 N.E.3d 910, 917-18 (Ohio 2014).
294. See, e.g., In re Scudieri, 174 A.D.3d 168, 171-74 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (exchanging sexually explicit
photographs with a client after engaging in a consensual sexual relationship).
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denied engaging in inappropriate conduct in the courthouse. Authorities sus-
pended him for two years.295
Of the nineteen disciplinary actions that involved sexual misconduct, 42%
were nonconsensual and 58% were ostensibly consensual but otherwise exploita-
tive or inappropriate. This finding is a notable one, given the relative inattention
professional responsibility scholars and rulemakers have paid to ostensibly con-
sensual sexual contact.296
3. BREACH OF TRUST (6.1% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 13.8% OF SINGLE FTP VIOLATIONS)
By virtue of their positions, lawyers are entrusted to act in the best interests of
their clients and constituents. Beyond the all-too-common mismanagement of cli-
ent funds, which is captured by the financial-improprieties category, lawyers
sometimes take advantage of this trust and use it to serve their own personal ends.
That type of misconduct comprises the breach-of-trust category.
Because government attorneys and private attorneys have differing responsi-
bilities, the types of misconduct constituting a breach of trust are similarly varied.
Public officials, i.e., those who hold public office or who have similar responsibil-
ities, may abuse their position of trust for financial or similar gain. For instance,
Marc Dann, the Ohio Attorney General, received a six-month suspension for pro-
viding two aides with free rental housing and benefits, paid for out of his political
campaign fund.297 In upholding his suspension, the Supreme Court of Ohio high-
lighted "the unique harm to the legal profession and to public confidence in our
government when the attorney general ... engages in misconduct. "298
For other government attorneys, breach-of-trust violations often involve the use of
lawful tools and resources for improper purposes. An Ohio lawyer who had access to
confidential information for law enforcement purposes r ceived a public reprimand af-
ter she used it to research four people whom she or her friends were dating.2w
Similarly, authorities suspended the chief legal counsel for a state administrative
department for six months after he used his authority to intercept a number of confiden-
tial emails, including those related to ongoing criminal and ethical investigations.300
For private attorneys, breach-of-trust violations frequently involve the exploi-
tation of especially vulnerable clients. These clients may suffer from physical or
295. Disciplinary Counsel v. Benbow, 106 N.E.3d 57, 58-60 (Ohio 2018); see also Randy Ludlow, Lawyer
Suspended for Sex Act with Client Caught on Video in Courthouse, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 12, 2018),
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20180712/lawyer-suspended-for-sex-act-with-client-caught-on-video-in-courthouse
[https://perma.cc/P8PV-SMWD] (discussing the incident and sanction).
296. See, e.g., Craig D. Feiser, Strange Bedfellows: The Effectiveness of Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client
Sexual Relations, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 53, 55 (2008) (arguing that per se bans on consensual sexual relations
between attorneys and clients are unnecessary).
297. Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 979 N.E.2d 1263, 1265-66 (Ohio. 2012).
298. Id. at 1267.
299. Disciplinary Counsel v. Rosen, 41 N.E.3d 383, 383-84 (Ohio 2015).
300. Disciplinary Counsel v. Engel, 969 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Ohio 2012).
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mental infirmities,3 1 face language barriers,30 2 or be acutely in need of legal serv-
ices,303 causing them to put even greater trust in their attorneys as fiduciaries. In
Alabama, an attorney began assisting an elderly client with his finances and prop-
erty following the death of the client's wife. Thereafter, the lawyer ousted the cli-
ent from his own home, sold the home without the client's knowledge, was
appointed the beneficiary of the client's trust, and filed a lawsuit on the client's
behalf using trust funds without the client's knowledge.304 Ultimately, the attor-
ney was disbarred for this and other related misconduct.305 Another common
occurrence arises when attorneys threaten to withdraw from representation unless
the client agrees to their demands, sometimes including demands not to file disci-
plinary complaints against them.306
Although the improprieties of government attorneys, especially public offi-
cials, more frequently make the headlines,307 they represented only 25% of the
fifty-six disciplinary actions in this category; the other 75% concerned private
attorneys.
4. UNTRUTHFULNESS (17.7% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 13.8% OF SINGLE FTP
VIOLATIONS)
Whereas the first three categories may contain misconduct that does not fall
under a state's other ethics rules, all misconduct in the untruthfulness category
should in theory fall under the fraud provision, which proscribes "conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."'3 08 It might also violate a more
specific provision such as Rule 3.3(a), which prohibits the making of false state-
ments or presenting false evidence to a tribunal.309 Indeed, 97.5% of the 162
301. In re Gillis, No. BD-2016-052 (Mass. 2019) (Gaziano, J., single justice), available at https://bbopublic.
blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bd16-052-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/39QH-67AE] (misappropriating funds held for
disabled brother-in-law).
302. See, e.g., In re Donaldson, No. BD-2012-045 (Mass. 2012) (Lenk J., single justice), available at https://
bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bdl2-045.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUF7-W687] (committing several
unethical actions toward client who did not speak English).
303. See, e.g., Disciplinary Notices, ALA. LAW., Jan. 2013, at 67-68, https://www.alabar.org/assets/2014/
08/TheAlabama _Lawyer _01-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN2Y-9GB8] (committing numerous actions that
facilitated the defrauding of inmates).
304. Disciplinary Notices, ALA. LAW., Mar. 2014, at 134, https://www.alabar.org/assets/2014/08/
TheAlabama _Lawyer _03-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VB8-8PXD].
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., In re Freyleue, No. BD-2013-088 (Mass. 2013) (Lenk J., single justice), available at https://
bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bdl3-088.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HF8-45BG] (eighteen-month suspension,
in part based on requiring clients to withdraw bar complaint as condition of settlement).
307. See, e.g., Mary Moore, Former Massachusetts Prosecutor Indicted for Allegedly Trading Information
for Oxycodone Pills, BOs. Bus. J. (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2015/01/08/
former-massachusetts-prosecutor-indicted-for.html [https://perma.cc/VF88-BPJE] (discussing indictment of
prosecutor who was indefinitely suspended for sharing confidential information with drug suppliers).
308. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(c).
309. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a).
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disciplinary actions in this category cite multiple rule violations as the basis for
discipline.
In attempting to ascertain why these disciplinary actions also included a viola-
tion of the FTP provision, it was discovered that one of three circumstances typi-
cally was present: (1) the lawyer had made affirmative false statements to
clients;3 10 (2) the lawyer had forged a signature on a legal document, often the
signature of a client, opposing party, or legal official; 3 1 or (3) the lawyer had
made a false statement o a tribunal or other governmental authority, such as the
IRS.3 1 2 Given these themes, the FTP-provision violation appears to capture more
egregious instances of lawyer untruthfulness-precisely the types that would
seriously call into question a lawyer's fitness to practice.
5. INEPT LAWYERING (35.0% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 10.3% OF SINGLE FTP
VIOLATIONS)
The inept-lawyering category consists of legal services that fail to meet the
standard expected of a lawyer representing a client or in a similar governmental
role. These types of misconduct often lead to bar complaints: failing to take
timely action, lack of communication, and shoddy legal work, among others.313
As with the untruthfulness category, conduct constituting inept lawyering almost
invariably violates more specific rules-99.1% of the 321 disciplinary actions in
this category included violations of other rules in addition to the FTP provision.
Because of the lack of detail in many disciplinary actions, it is sometimes
unclear why the authority found a violation of the FTP provision along with more
specific rules. But in a state such as Ohio, which now requires that misconduct
violating another rule be sufficiently egregious, the opinions note the aspects of
the misconduct that met that threshold. These may include repeated instances of
misconduct concerning a single client or similar misconduct affecting multiple
clients.314 The latter was involved when authorities suspended an Ohio attorney
for two years after he filed nearly identical briefs in thirty-one of thirty-five crimi-
nal appeals that he was appointed to handle over a four-year period.315
310. See, e.g., In re Barry, No. BD-2012-022 (Mass. 2012) (Duffy J., single justice), available at https://
bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bdl2-022.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN3D-SZB5] (misrepresenting to
client the status of litigation and the suspension of his bar license).
311. See, e.g., Warren Cty. Bar Ass'n v. Vardiman, 51 N.E.3d 587, 590 (Ohio 2016) (forging opposing
party's signature on legal documents submitted to tribunal).
312. See, e.g., In re Breines, No. BD-2016-084 (Mass. 2017) (Lowy J., single justice), available at https://
bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bdl6-084.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJF7-AAX6] (providing forged and
falsified documents to FBI).
313. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
314. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Holmes, 120 N.E.3d 820, 822 (Ohio 2018) (asserting that "the board
specifically found that because Holmes and Kerr had improperly disclosed confidential client information over
an almost two-year period, their conduct was sufficiently egregious to constitute a separate [FTP] violation");
Disciplinary Counsel v. Milhoan, 29 N.E.3d 898, 899 (Ohio 2014) (finding FTP-provision violation for provid-
ing incompetent representation to thirty-one criminal defendants).
315. Milhoan, 29 N.E.3d at 899.
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Apparently each client matter had been billed as though the attorney had done in-
dependent work on it and, to make matters worse, the recycled template brief
reflected substandard work.3 16 In addition, there were a number of instances of
lawyers failing to complete relatively simple legal matters in a timely fashion (or
at all)-such as a New York lawyer who was censured for failing to finalize a
divorce action for sixteen years.3 7
6. FINANCIAL IMPROPRIETIES (33.6% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 6.9% OF SINGLE FTP
VIOLATIONS)
Disciplinary authorities frequently say that the surest way for a lawyer to lose a
bar license is to commit financial misconduct.318 Therefore, it is not surprising that
financial improprieties appear quite prominently as the basis of FTP-provision vio-
lations; mishandling and converting client funds certainly call into question the
ability to ethically practice law. Initially, misconduct in this category was put into
the inept-lawyering category because it relates to one of the central responsibilities
of a lawyer. However, given its frequent appearance in the disciplinary actions
under study-over one-third of the actions reviewed-it was isolated for separate
consideration in its own category.
As with the inept-lawyering category, nearly all disciplinary actions in the
financial-improprieties category included a violation of at least one other rule,
frequently Rule 1.15, which governs the safeguarding of client property, or
the crime provision. In order to avoid excessive overlap between the financial-
improprieties and inept-lawyering categories, the former includes only instances
in which the lawyer mishandled or converted funds. It does not include instances
in which a lawyer neglected to refund fees in a timely fashion or charged an ex-
cessive fee, unless it appeared that the conduct was committed repeatedly or had
been done with a financial motive. This is because those actions often indicate 
lack of diligence or competence in connection with a particular client matter
rather than financial impropriety.
7. BAR MISSTEPS (17.7% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 0.0% OF SINGLE FTP VIOLATIONS)
FTP-provision violations often were correlated with violations of Rule 8.1,
which governs bar admission and disciplinary matters, as well as with two state-
specific bar catchall provisions.319 Furthermore, there were even more discipli-
nary opinions that had not cited a violation of one of those other rules in
316. Id. at 899-900.
317. In re Thomas, 159 A.D.3d 35, 36-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
318. See, e.g., Martin A. Cole, 55 Ways to Lose Your License, 66 BENCH & B. MINN. 14, 14 (2009), http://
lprb.mncourts.gov/articles/Articles/55%2OWays%20to%2OLose%20your%2OLicense.pdf [https://perma.
cc/LT6H-RW6U] (asserting that "[i]t should come as no surprise that various forms of financial
misconduct top the list of ways to lose your license").
319. See supra Table 6.
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conjunction with the FTP provision yet involved a similar type of misconduct.320
In total, four types of conduct emerged: (1) failing to comply with requirements
for maintaining a law license (e.g., continuing legal education or payment of
fees);321 (2) failing to respond to disciplinary authorities;32 2 (3) making false rep-
resentations to disciplinary authorities ; 23 and (4) failing to abide by decisions of
disciplinary authorities.32 4
The fourth type of conduct included a number of attorneys who continued to
practice law while suspended from practice. In some instances, the attorney also
committed other misconduct, such as failing to competently and diligently pursue
client matters. In such a case, the disciplinary action was categorized under both
the inept-lawyering and bar-missteps categories.32 5 In others, there was no proof
of deficient representation, but the fact that the attorney contravened an order to
cease practicing law resulted in the action being placed into the bar-missteps
category.326
8. ORDINARY CRIMES (10.0% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 27.6% OF SINGLE FTP
VIOLATIONS)
All states in this study have adopted a version of Rule 8.4(b), which proscribes
"commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trust-
worthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."32 7 Nevertheless, all states
other than Colorado cited the FTP provision as the disciplinary basis for the com-
mission of some so-called "ordinary" crimes; that is, criminal conduct not
directly connected with the attorney's legal practice. The types of crimes varied
considerably; they included crimes of violence,328 possession of child pornogra-
phy,329 tax evasion or underreporting,330 possession or distribution of controlled
320. See, e.g., In re Roper, No. BD-2016-055 (Mass. 2016) (Cordy J., single justice), available at https://
bbopublic.blob.core.windows.net/web/f/bdl6-055.pdf [https://perma.cc/33RA-BHL7] (failing to notify Board
of Bar Overseers that her insurance had lapsed).
321. See, e.g., id.
322. See, e.g., In re Falk, 138 A.D.3d 25, 27-28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
323. See, e.g., In re Williams, 362 P.3d 816, 819-20 (Kan. 2015) (detailing multiple false representations to
disciplinary administrator).
324. See, e.g., Disciplinary Notices, ALA. LAw., May 2019, at 207, https://www.alabar.org/assets/2019/05/
2019-May-AL-Lawyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3QC-T5AR] (violating disciplinary order by practicing law
while suspended).
325. See, e.g., In re Shaw, 180 A.D.3d 1, 2-3 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (detailing an example of neglect of a
client matter while suspended).
326. See, e.g., Disciplinary Notices, supra note 324, at 207.
327. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(b); see note 77 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Disciplinary Notices, ALA. LAw., May 2013, at 198, https://www.alabar.org/assets/2014/08/
TheAlabama _Lawyer _05-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/6X3B-3GB5] (assault).
329. See, e.g., Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Ballato, 34 N.E.3d 858, 858-59 (Ohio 2014).




substances,3 operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol,3 2
failing to pay court-ordered obligations,333 and fleeing the scene of an accident.33 4
Most of the time, the commission of a single crime appeared to be the reason
for the FTP violation. However, a few opinions specifically identified the repeti-
tion of unlawful conduct or its connection to legal processes as the basis for disci-
pline. This was especially true in Ohio following the Bricker decision because of
the requirement that the conduct be sufficiently egregious to warrant the addi-
tional finding of an FTP violation.35
9. OTHER MISFEASANCE (2.3% OF ALL FTP VIOLATIONS, 6.9% OF SINGLE FTP
VIOLATIONS)
As the "catchall category" for a catchall provision, the other-misfeasance cate-
gory contains misconduct not occurring often enough to merit a separate category
but that reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice. Although one might
worry that an "other" category might sweep in conduct that should not be regu-
lated-whether because of constitutional concerns or fears of overreaching-a
review of these disciplinary actions indicates that disciplinary authorities have
not been administering the FTP provision in that way.
By and large, the misconduct at issue was analogous to misconduct falling
under other categories. For example, there were several disciplinary actions in
which lawyers demanded or traded controlled substances (rather than sexual
favors) in connection with their representation of clients.336 For example, a New
York attorney was suspended for a year for "his purchase of heroin from a client
on multiple occasions while representing him on a drug possession and sale
case." 3 While the attorney's conduct was undoubtedly criminal, it had an addi-
tional facet of impropriety given its connection with a client matter and the nature
of the legal representation. In other disciplinary actions, lawyers had committed
assaults on current adversaries or former colleagues.338
But there were other disciplinary actions that defied categorization elsewhere.
An Ohio lawyer allowed a law firm with which he was associated to use his
331. See, e.g., ALA. ST. BAR, supra note 240 (private reprimand on Apr. 4, 2014 for marijuana possession
and possession of drug paraphernalia).
332. See, e.g., In re Meyer, 362 P.3d 598, 601-03 (Kan. 2015).
333. See, e.g., In re Florez, 316 P.3d 755, 759-61 (Kan. 2014) (failure to pay child support).
334. See, e.g., Stark Cty. Bar Ass'n v. Zimmer, 989 N.E.2d 51, 53 (Ohio 2013).
335. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Lindner, 81 N.E.3d 453, 455 (Ohio 2017) (basing FTP-provision vio-
lation on "volume, seriousness, recklessness, and repetitiveness of [attorney's] unremitting lawless behavior").
336. See, e.g., People v. Athanasiou, 2012 Colo. Discipl. LEXIS 51, *1, 2012 WL 4163234 (Colo. Sept. 20,
2012), available at https://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/pdj/Decisions/Athanasiou,%20Conditional%20
Admission%20of%20Misconduct,%2012PDJ069,%20%2009-20-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRK2-MTFG] (accepting
cocaine as legal fees).
337. In re Linn, 163 A.D.3d 120, 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
338. See, e.g., Stipulation to Disbarment, In re Graeff, No. 18#00485, 1-3 (Wash. St. Bar Ass'n
Disciplinary Bd. Aug. 22, 2019), available at https://www.mywsba.org/WebFiles/CusDocs/000000048235-0/
013.pdf (discharging weapon after disagreement with lawyer with w om respondent had worked).
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attorney number and electronic signature but failed to monitor its use, which led
to the firm entering into a number of client contracts without his knowledge.339 A
New York lawyer failed to make timely payments of his state and federal income
taxes over a twenty-eight year period; even though his actions were not criminal
or prejudicial to the administration of justice, he was publicly censured for violat-
ing the FTP provision.3 40 There was even a Kansas attorney who, while represent-
ing a client in a capital case, called his client a "professional drug dealer" and
"shooter of people," and told the jury during the sentencing phase that his client
should be executed.341 This conduct goes beyond anything included in the inept-
lawyering or breach-of-trust categories, striking at the very heart of the client-
lawyer relationship.
F. RESULTS BY CATEGORY
Figure 5 displays the distribution of FTP-provision violations by category.3 42 The
solid bars represent the distribution among all disciplinary actions that contain an
FTP-provision violation, and the dashed bars represent the distribution for discipli-
nary actions in which the FTP provision was the sole basis for discipline. Taken to-
gether, these sets of bars show that the FTP provision often is being used to regulate
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FIGURE 5: Categorical distribution of FTP violations.
Unsurprisingly, when the FTP provision is one of multiple rule violations in a
disciplinary action, the misconduct is more likely to be related to inept lawyering
(35.0%), financial improprieties (33.6%), untruthfulness (17.7%), or bar missteps
(17.7%)-the categories associated with other frequently-violated rules. However,
339. Disciplinary Counsel v. Lorenzon, 978 N.E.2d 183, 185-87 (Ohio 2012).
340. In re Rogoff, 147 A.D.3d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
341. In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573, 585 (Kan. 2014).
342. The vast majority of disciplinary actions (97.4%) fell into a single category (72.5%) or two categories
(24.9%).
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when the FTP provision is the sole source of discipline, there is a large percentage
increase in the abusive-conduct (+542%), sexual-misconduct (+229%), breach-
of-trust (+126%), and other-misfeasance (+200%) categories. These increases
are generally coupled with decreases in the categories associated with other fre-
quently-violated rules. The only apparent outlier is the ordinary-crimes category,
which was implicated in 10.0% of all actions citing an FTP-provision violation
and 27.6% of actions citing only an FTP-provision violation. Upon closer inspec-
tion, many of these latter disciplinary actions involved lawyers who had been
arrested for a crime but who had not been convicted or who had pled guilty to
another minor offense. These circumstances could explain why the disciplinary
authorities cited the FTP provision rather than the crime provision.34 3
While these results suggest that the FTP provision is used in different ways,
they do not indicate whether and how these results differ by state. Figures 6-A
and 6-B address these issues, depicting the categorical distribution of all FTP-
provision violations by state.344 Figure 6-A depicts the "traditional" categories







Untruthfulness Inept Lawyering Financial Bar Missteps Ordinary Crimes
Improprieties
EAL CO KS EMA ENY SOH EWA ETotal
FIGURE 6-A: Distribution by state-traditional categories.
Some states, including Alabama, New York, and Washington, use the FTP pro-
vision more frequently in connection with these traditional categories. In
Alabama and New York, this is likely because authorities in both states fre-
quently cite the FTP provision as a basis for their disciplinary actions (75.6% and
343. See, e.g., ALA. ST. BAR, supra note 240 (private reprimand on May 10, 2012 for public intoxication on
university campus).
344. Given the low number of disciplinary actions in which the FTP provision was the sole source of disci-
pline (29), it was impossible to provide a meaningful distribution for those actions by state.
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91.4% of all actions, respectively)345 and do not appear to have any specified cri-
teria for its use. In Washington, the FTP provision is cited infrequently (4% of all
actions),346 but it is almost exclusively used in cases of disbarment-cases where,
by their nature, the attorney likely has committed a number of improprieties that
have prompted the imposition of such a severe sanction.347 While Massachusetts
frequently cites violations of the FTP provision (60% of all actions),348 the state
deploys it more frequently for the commission of financial improprieties (42%)
than for other types of misconduct. By contrast, Kansas uses the FTP provision
more often for ordinary crimes (25%) and-astonishingly-never uses it for mis-
conduct that would fall into the untruthfulness category.3 4 9
Figure 6-B displays the distribution by state of the nontraditional categories
that are not clearly associated with other existing rules. A different set of states
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FIGURE 6-B: Distribution by state-nontraditional categories.
To be clear, the exceedingly high percentages for Colorado reflect the fact that
the state had only four FTP-provision violations during the time period under
study. Accordingly, no inferences should be drawn based on those percentages
alone. However, these results, coupled with those in Figure 6-A, show that
345. See supra Figure 1.
346. See supra Figure 1.
347. See, e.g., In re Hunt, No. 13#00085 (Wash. St. Bar Ass'n Disciplinary Bd. Dec. 31, 2013), available at
https://www.mywsba.org/WebFiles/CusDocs/000000033499-0/0421.pdf [https://perma.cc/5A36-GT2U]
(disbarment based on ten counts of misconduct and violations of numerous rules and provisions, including
the FTP provision).
348. See supra Figure 1.
349. See supra Figure 6-A.
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Colorado is exclusively using the FTP provision to regulate misconduct that does
not fit within the purview of currently-existing rules. Kansas regularly uses the
FTP provision to sanction misconduct that constitutes a breach of trust (21%) or
abusive conduct (13%)."'
Ohio also uses the FTP provision to regulate misconduct that involves a breach
of trust (11%).351 Notably, out of the fourteen breach-of-trust violations that
involved government attorneys, twelve (86%) arose in Ohio. This finding indi-
cates that Ohio in particular has latched on to the FTP provision as a way to regu-
late those types of public-facing improprieties. Furthermore, Ohio has used the
FTP provision to sanction sexual misconduct at a higher-than-average rate (5%
versus 2%), although the numbers and percentages still are low from an absolute
perspective.
States that cite the FTP provision more frequently, such as Alabama,
Massachusetts, and New York, have lower percentages of FTP-provision viola-
tions that fall into the nontraditional categories.353 These results are to be
expected given their orientations toward the FTP provision and the various types
of traditional misconduct o which they ascribe FTP-provision violations.
V. RECONSIDERING THE FITNESS-TO-PRACTICE PROVISION
As Part IV demonstrates, the FTP provision is far from a dead letter for those
states that have retained it in their codes of professional conduct. In nearly all of
those states, it is strongly associated with more severe sanctions and, in some
states, it is being used to capture more information about the egregiousness of the
conduct than is captured through other rules. Furthermore, the FTP provision is
being used to regulate a variety of categories of misconduct, including some that
are not fully covered by other rules.
This Part examines the utility of the FTP provision as a tool to regulate the con-
tinually-evolving and nuanced ways in which lawyer misconduct may arise. It
concludes that the FTP provision can be a valuable tool to regulate elusive lawyer
misconduct and recommends its widespread adoption, even in states that have
adopted Rule 8.4(g) or a similar anti-bias provision. In order to maximize its
effectiveness and address criticisms about its potential for misuse, however, states
should abide by the best practices identified below.
A. FTP PROVISION AS TOOL TO REGULATE ELUSIVE MISCONDUCT
The results of the empirical study in Part IV indicate that there are two distinct
ways in which disciplinary authorities use the FTP provision to sanction attorneys
who commit misconduct. First, a disciplinary authority may find a violation of
350. See supra Figure 6-B.
351. See supra Figure 6-B.
352. See supra Figure 6-B.
353. See supra Figure 6-B.
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the FTP provision where the attorney has engaged in egregious misconduct that
goes beyond a routine violation of an existing ethics rule. In all states that have
retained the FTP provision, there is a positive relationship between having an
FTP-provision violation and the imposition of more severe sanctions such as dis-
barment.3 5 4 Moreover, in Ohio and Massachusetts in particular, the FTP provision
is independently predictive of the imposition of more severe sanctions-meaning
that it serves a distinct "ratcheting" function that is not fulfilled by other ethics
rules.3" In fact, Ohio authorities are expressly administering the FTP provision in
this manner and indicate as much in their disciplinary opinions.356
Second, disciplinary authorities are using the FTP provision to regulate mis-
conduct that does not clearly fall within a state's existing ethics rules-including
discrimination and harassment. Colorado provides an apt example of this second
use of the FTP provision, in that disciplinary authorities there may use the FTP
provision only in these circumstances. Before Colorado's recent adoption of a
sexual harassment provision i  its code, disciplinary authorities successfully used
the FTP provision to sanction attorneys who had committed sexual harassment in
connection with their professional activities.357 But even in a state such as Ohio
that has adopted an anti-bias provision, disciplinary authorities still use the FTP
provision to sanction attorneys who commit such misconduct-perhaps because
the state's anti-bias provision is limited to conduct that is "prohibited by law.''
358
These two examples show that the FTP provision can be used to regulate miscon-
duct that falls between the cracks, either because the state has not adopted a more
specific rule or because a specific rule has limitations that prevent it from effec-
tively covering the ways in which lawyer misconduct may manifest itself.
Furthermore, the FTP provision is more than just an alternative for states that
are unable to adopt a version of Rule 8.4(g) for legal or policy reasons. This study
reveals that the FTP provision is also used to regulate other types of misconduct,
including abusive conduct that does not fall squarely within the definitions of dis-
crimination or harassment, sexual misconduct, breaches of trust, and other instan-
ces of misfeasance that do not fit within a defined category.359 Although there
were only twenty-nine disciplinary opinions that found a single violation of the
FTP provision,3 0 that number surely is under-representative of the cases in which
a part of the lawyer's misconduct was not proscribed by another existing rule.
354. See supra Part IV.D.
355. See supra Part IV.D (describing the additional data modeling for Ohio and Massachusetts).
356. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Adelstein, 159 N.E.3d 1126, 1129 (Ohio 2020) (recent opinion
affirming FTP-provision violation for multiple successive trust account violations).
357. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
358. OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g); see, e.g., Lake Cty. Bar Ass'n v. Mismas, 11 N.E.3d 1180
(Ohio 2014) (finding single FTP violation where an attorney sent sexually inappropriate texts to third-year law
student).
359. See supra Part I.E.
360. Supra Table 3.
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Nevertheless, because most states do not provide that level of detail in their opin-
ions, it is impossible to know precisely how frequently that occurs.
Conceived of in this way, disciplinary authorities can use the FTP provision to
regulate attorney misconduct that should be sanctionable except for the fact that
there is not (yet) a specific rule that adequately covers the conduct. In this regard,
the significant number of Ohio cases that involve breaches of trust committed by
government attorneys suggests hat the state's ethics code might eventually include
a more specifically targeted provision.361 Likewise, there were several cases of sex-
ual misconduct that might not constitute sexual harassment but clearly called into
question the lawyer's ability to ethically practice.3 62 One wonders whether lawyers
in other states evade discipline for these types of misconduct because those states'
codes lack an FTP provision. While disciplinary authorities could try to frame the
misconduct in such a way that it violates another existing rule, doing so would risk
the disciplinary action not representing the true nature of the underlying conduct.
Despite the persuasive empirical evidence that he FTP provision is a valuable
tool for regulating attorney misconduct, it was eliminated during the transition
from the Model Code to the Model Rules based on two sets of concerns. These
concerns must be addressed in order to determine conclusively whether the ABA
and other states should adopt the FTP provision.
The first set of concerns was related to the vagueness and potential overbreadth
of the FTP provision, which could raise due process concerns.363 To be sure, the
language of the FTP provision is vague-by design-since one of its roles is to
capture misconduct that is not fully addressed by existing rules.364 Evaluating the
actual use of the FTP provision in the states that have retained it, it is apparent
that these concerns are unfounded in practice. The FTP provision was the sole ba-
sis for imposing discipline in only twenty-nine cases, representing just 3.2% of
the total disciplinary actions that found an FTP violation.365
Even in those twenty-nine cases, the sanctioned lawyers would be hard pressed to
argue that they had no notice that their conduct was unethical and could lead to disci-
pline. Five of the nine categories in the taxonomy of FTP-provision violations are
associated with existing ethics rules; thus, an attorney whose conduct falls into one of
those categories should be on notice that their conduct was improper. For the other
four categories-abusive conduct, sexual misconduct, breach of trust, and other mis-
feasance-the misconduct at issue was, if anything, more wrongful than that which
would fall under another existing ethics rule. That is not surprising since, by defini-
tion, the misconduct must reflect adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice. With
361. See supra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
362. See supra Part IV.E.1-.2.
363. See supra Part I.B (identifying possible reasons for elimination of FTP provision during transition to
Model Rules).
364. See Levine, supra note 21, at 550-58 (discussing the necessarily broad language of the FTP provision
and how it has been evaluated by disciplinary authorities and courts).
365. Supra Table 3.
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regard to discrimination and harassment in particular, the FTP provision was never
used to sanction lawyer negligence or inadvertence. Nor were there any disciplinary
actions over the eight-year period in which an attorney had mounted a successful
constitutional challenge to a finding of an FTP-provision violation.366
The second set of concerns was related to the potential for duplication of existing
rules, including other catchall provisions uch as the fraud provision, crime provi-
sion, and administration-of-justice provision.3 67 The response to these concerns is a
bit more nuanced and varies by state. Although there were only twenty-nine discipli-
nary actions that cited the FTP provision as the sole basis for imposing discipline,
that number under-represents its impact in at least two ways. First, as noted earlier, a
number of disciplinary actions cited the FTP provision as the basis for regulating
one aspect of the lawyer's conduct but included other rule violations as well.
Second, some states are using the FTP provision to identify instances of egregious
conduct that simultaneously violates another ule. But instead of viewing this use of
the FTP provision as a mere duplication of existing rules, it should be seen as denot-
ing additional misfeasance relevant to the imposition of sanctions-that is, it has a
ratcheting function. When used in that manner, the FTP provision is elevating the
degree of an offense, as provisions in the criminal codes of most states do.368 At least
where the disciplinary authority identifies that it is using the FTP provision in this
way and articulates the aspects of the attorney's conduct that are egregious, the FTP
provision has a clearly identifiable and separate function. But in New York, a viola-
tion of the FTP provision does not appear to be much more than a rubber stamp on
nearly all disciplinary actions.369 In that instance, the criticism is well taken.
Assessing these results in light of the guiding principles for evaluating an
ethics rule identified in Part III.B, it follows that the FTP provision can be an
effective rule when disciplinary authorities have clearly articulated its proper use
and consistently administer it. In several states, including Colorado, Ohio, and
Massachusetts, it serves one or more distinct functions. With regard to the regula-
tion of abusive conduct that might not otherwise meet he legal definition of dis-
crimination or harassment, the FTP provision fills a regulatory gap. On the other
hand, in states such as New York and Alabama, the indiscriminate use of the FTP
provision undercuts the purpose of having this type of catchall provision, espe-
cially when it is regularly used in connection with less-severe sanctions.
Likewise, while some states have included additional guidance to ensure that its
application is effectively tailored, others apparently have given less thought to its
application, leading to uncertainty about its use.
366. One Massachusetts decision affirmed a dismissal of a petition for discipline for an FTP-provision vio-
lation because of concerns about notice, but that decision did not hold that the imposition of discipline would
have been unconstitutional. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
368. See Miriam H. Baer, Sorting Out White-Collar Crime, 97 TEx. L. REV. 225, 233-34 (2018) (providing
brief history of grading offenses and discussing the pervasiveness of the practice among states).
369. See supra Table 1 (91.4% of New York disciplinary actions cite FTP provision).
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B. BEST PRACTICES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Notwithstanding the variation among states that have retained the FTP provi-
sion, this Article strongly recommends that the ABA and all states adopt such a
provision. But given this variation and, in some instances, de facto practices that
have limited or undercut the purpose and value of the FTP provision, this section
identifies five best practices for successfully implementing it. These best practices
can be implemented both in the seven states that currently have the provision and
in other states in which it may be adopted.
First, disciplinary authorities should identify and clearly articulate the roles
that the FTP provision will serve. In so doing, disciplinary authorities can prop-
erly identify the FTP provision's regulatory objectives and ensure that it promotes
the relevant constituent interests.370 Colorado and Ohio have taken positive steps
in that direction: their state supreme courts have identified the ways in which the
FTP provision may (and may not) be used. For Colorado, the FTP provision is
truly a gap filler; for Ohio, it may be a gap filler or denote especially egregious
conduct that violates another rule.371 But even these states could do more. Ideally,
states would include an associated comment describing the types of misconduct
to which the FTP provision would apply. This comment could be expanded upon
through the issuance of formal ethics opinions that could provide examples of
conduct that would-and would not-be subject to discipline. It should also
address whether the lawyer's conduct would need to satisfy a particular mental
state or whether it is merely a consideration in determining whether the conduct
reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice.372 This would put attorneys
on greater notice of the workings of the provision, so that they could conform
their conduct accordingly. Indeed, the ABA has already recognized the need to
do so in relation to its adoption of Rule 8.4(g).373
Second, disciplinary opinions should clearly identify which aspects of an attor-
ney's conduct violated the FTP provision, as is done in Ohio. This practice has a
number of benefits. From a deterrence perspective, it provides valuable informa-
tion for attorneys who seek to avoid discipline. From a consistency perspective, it
helps to ensure that the FTP provision is applied uniformly across cases. From a
procedural fairness and transparency perspective, it enables critics of the FTP
provision to understand how it is being applied. If stakeholders have concerns,
identifying the unethical aspects of the attorney's behavior allows critics to raise
and adjudicate them more effectively.
370. See supra Part III.B.1-.2.
371. See supra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
372. The author takes no position on whether a requisite mental state should be included. For a thoughtful
discussion of the issue, see generally Moore, supra note 223.
373. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, supra note 155 (explaining the scope and appli-
cation of Rule 8.4(g)).
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Third, disciplinary authorities should refrain from using the FTP provision indis-
criminately or redundantly, since doing so leads to claims that the rule does not have
a distinct function. The data from New York and Washington illustrate the crux of
these concerns. When the FTP provision is cited in nearly all disciplinary actions, as
it is in New York (91.4% of all actions),374 it appears to not have any independent
meaning. Such ubiquity prompts the question: what differentiated those cases from
the 8.6% that did not include a violation of the provision? In Washington the FTP
provision is cited infrequently, but it seems to be used as a pile-on provision in cases
in which disbarment was a foregone conclusion. These uses of the FTP provision do
not make positive contributions to the administration of discipline.
Fourth, disciplinary authorities should consider and articulate how the FTP provi-
sion fits into the state's ethics code. In Washington, where there are six additional
state-specific catchall provisions, the FTP provision has considerably less utility; it
was cited 4% of the time, whereas the other six catchall provisions were cited 48%
of the time.375 Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain precisely how the disciplinary
authorities in Washington determine which catchall provisions are violated by par-
ticular types of misconduct. This may lead to considerable confusion among attor-
neys or, perhaps worse, attempts to draw distinctions where they do not in fact
exist.376 If a state's ethics code already has other nontraditional catchall provisions,
rule-makers should consider streamlining them, perhaps into a single FTP provision.
Fifth, the FTP provision should not be the basis of discipline for ordinary law-
yer misconduct and, when it is the basis of discipline, it generally should result in
a public sanction. If the FTP provision is to serve a distinct function, it cannot be
used to regulate misconduct that is completely governed by a more specific rule.
This is not to say that the FTP provision cannot be used to denote particularly
egregious conduct, but that use should be specifically identified by the discipli-
nary authority in its opinion. By the same token, FTP-provision violations should,
by their nature, result in public sanctions. It is incongruous to make a finding that
a lawyer engaged in misconduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to
practice, yet simultaneously determine that such misconduct does not warrant a
public sanction. Of course, there may be exceptions, but one would expect to see
sanctioning patterns more similar to that of Massachusetts, in which 4.7% of pri-
vate sanctions include an FTP-provision violation, than that of Alabama, in which
38.1% of private sanctions do.377 Indeed, this high percentage of private sanctions
in Alabama suggests that the state may be using the FTP provision to regulate or-
dinary lawyer misconduct and may explain why the FTP provision is not an inde-
pendently significant predictor of the type of sanction imposed there.
374. Supra Table 1.
375. Supra Table 4.
376. Cf. Robinson, supra note 187, at 9 n.18 (discussing the problems in having duplicative provisions
within a single criminal code).




Bias and prejudice have long existed in the legal profession. Yet only relatively
recently have those in the profession come to recognize that the profession has an
obligation to sanction attorneys who manifest bias and prejudice through harass-
ment and discriminatory acts. It then took decades for the ABA to adopt Model
Rule 8.4(g), and its reception by states has been lukewarm at best to antagonistic
at worst. To be clear, this Article does not suggest that states should decline to
adopt an anti-bias provision such as Rule 8.4(g). To the contrary, it is critically
important for our professional codes to explicitly proscribe discrimination and
harassment in the course of a lawyer's professional activities.
The Rule 8.4(g) controversy is an instructive one, however, because it shows
that it is nearly impossible to adopt such a provision without facing criticism that
it goes too far yet does so little. And even when a state enacts such a provision,
questions arise about what categories should be included. Should it cover socioe-
conomic status? What about a lawyer who discriminates on account of military
service or veteran status? What about gender expression in addition to gender
identity? What if the basis for the harassment or discrimination is not clear?
When disciplinary authorities have a general catchall rule such as the FTP pro-
vision, they can continue to regulate misconduct in the multitude of ways that it
is manifested, while simultaneously allowing the code to keep pace with our pro-
fession's evolving understanding of unethical conduct. Unfortunately, the ABA
failed to retain the FTP provision in the transition from the Model Code to the
Model Rules based on concerns about vagueness, overbreadth, and duplication.
As the results of this empirical study have demonstrated, these concerns are
largely unfounded. In several of the seven states that chose to retain the FTP pro-
vision, it has been used to denote and sanction particularly egregious conduct that
also violates an existing rule. In Colorado, it was used to regulate sexual harass-
ment before the adoption of a more specific rule. In Kansas and Ohio, it has been
used to sanction lawyers who breached the trust placed in them by clients and the
general public. In several states, it has been used to regulate abusive conduct or
sexual misconduct that may not fit within the legal definitions of harassment or
discrimination. For these reasons, it is strongly recommended that the ABA and
all states incorporate the FTP provision into their professional codes.
On the other hand, these results do not suggest that the FTP provision is a cure-
all. Without additional guidance on how the provision should be applied, discipli-
nary authorities may use it indiscriminately or ineffectively to regulate miscon-
duct that should be sanctioned under different rules-or not at all. Given the
inherently broad language of the FTP provision, it is critical that states define the
ways it will be used, clearly articulate its use, and administer discipline accord-
ingly. Otherwise, disciplinary authorities' biases could influence determinations
and subvert the very purposes for which the FTP provision should be adopted.
2021] 421

